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ABSTRACT 
Title of Dissertation:   Securing the Gulf: Towards an Integrated Maritime Security 
Strategy for the Gulf of Guinea 
 
Degree:    Master of Science 
The resurgence of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea in 2007 greatly affected the economy of 
some West African states especially Nigeria and Benin. The severity of attacks by 
pirates led to United Nations Security Council  resolution 2018 (2011) expressing deep 
concern about the threat posed by piracy in the region and an intention for a cooperative 
regional action to combat this maritime security crime . 
Despite current efforts by some states in the region to curb piracy, this maritime security 
challenge still persists. Some factors identified as fuelling piracy include weak 
legislation, inadequate capacity of coastal navies, proliferation of small arms and 
unemployment. To combat piracy in the region certain challenges identified as obstacles 
to cooperation need to be addressed. These include lack of political will, inadequate inter 
agency coordination, influence of extra regional powers and poor maritime domain 
awareness amongst others. 
This dissertation analyses the challenges to cooperation in the region as well as the 
strengths and limitations of the countermeasures implemented in other piracy hotspots 
such as Southeast Asia and Somalia. Particular attention is given to the Regional 
Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in 
Asia( ReCAAP) and Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC) with a view to suggesting a 
maritime  security strategy in the Gulf of Guinea as called for by the United Nations. 
Key words: Piracy, Maritime Security, Gulf of Guinea, Nigeria, Benin, Regional 
Cooperation. 
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Chapter 1 
1 - Introduction 
1.1  - Background 
Piracy in its various forms have posed a threat to trade and shipping for millennia 
(Mejia, Cariou & Wolff, 2010, p.2). Cilician pirates raided the Mediterranean in the age 
of Classical Greece and Rome, and the Vikings pillaged and terrorized the coasts of 
Europe. Pirates also roamed the waves of the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean (Havern, 
2012). 
Historically, efforts to suppress maritime piracy were characterized as acts of littoral 
warfare rather than constabulary or police action (Kraska, 2011a). In 67 BC, Roman 
general, Pompeius Magnus, was given authority to purge the Mediterranean seas of 
pirates. The General was given the wherewithal for three years and  had overriding 
authority in all provinces for up to fifty miles inland (Souza,2001). With the rise of 
England in the early modern period, nations thinking about the concept of piracy as a 
form of warfare faded. It led to the granting of letters of marque and reprisal, 
governments issued licences authorizing private vessels to attack and capture enemy 
vessels (Kraska, 2011a). 
However in 1856, the Paris Declaration of the worlds’ maritime powers abolished letters 
of marque. France and the United Kingdom signed an agreement to stop the granting of 
letters of marque because of the difficulty in controlling privateers (Hutchins, 2011, 
p.854). It was the confluence of naval technology, the maintenance of freedom of the 
seas by the Royal Navy and the progress of international law that contributed to the 
demise of maritime piracy. With the end of World War II, the hegemonic dominance of 
the United States Navy assured freedom of the seas and the safety of maritime 
commerce (Kraska, 2011a). 
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After the cold war and by the late 1980s, decolonization and globalization were forming 
the weak states and the shipping boom that would set conditions for a reemergence of 
piracy in the 1990s and 2000s. The epicenter of the new piracy in the 1990s and early 
2000s was Southeast Asia, but the center shifted to the Horn of Africa after 2005 
(Kraska, 2011a). 
Since 2007, much of the international efforts in combating piracy have been focused on 
Somalia waters, after taking over the number one spot of global piracy from Southeast 
Asia waters (Onuoha, 2012). According to Neethling (2010), of the almost 300 ships 
that were attacked in 2008, 111 were around the Horn of Africa and in the Gulf of Aden. 
Since 2009, attacks continued and a number of ships from various nations were seized 
(Neethling, 2010.p.90). The spike in attacks prompted the deployment in 2008 of an on-
going international coalition of navies to fight Somali piracy (Onuoha, 2012) 
The international focus on the challenges posed by Somali pirates, underscored the 
momentous threat that piracy in the Gulf of Guinea posed to the states in the region and 
international community as well (Pham, 2011). According to the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO), 64 incidents of piracy were reported in 9 countries of the Gulf of 
Guinea in 2011, up from 45 in 7 countries in 2010 (Baldauf, 2012). The reported 
incidents are so severe that some attacks off Benin and Nigeria involve a ship being 
hijacked and a significant part of its cargo stolen and losses from each attack range from 
US$2 million to $6 million (Ichikawa, 2012). The resultant effect is that Nigeria and 
other countries in the Gulf of Guinea are losing $2 billion annually to this maritime 
crime (Okwe, 2012). 
Further, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 10558 states that the 
threat of piracy was fitting together with other forms of transnational organized crimes, 
including oil bunkering, sea robbery, hostage-taking, human and drug trafficking and 
terrorism. As a matter of necessity, the United Nations Security Council could not ignore 
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the strategic economic importance of the Gulf of Guinea oil and the significant threat 
piracy posed to that vital commerce (United Nations Security Council, [UNSC], 2012b). 
As a consequence, UN Security Council Resolution 10558 clearly states that Gulf of 
Guinea countries need to develop a comprehensive and integrated regional anti-piracy 
strategy for the region (UNSC, 2012b). Supporting the UNSC resolution, Admiral Ola 
Ibrahim, the Nigeria Chief of Defence Staff, stressed the need for a collective approach 
on maritime security to protect the adjacent maritime environment since 38 out of 54 
states in Africa have coastal fronts (Ibrahim, 2012, p.8). 
Although every regional maritime security situation is unique, past experiences in other 
regions can provide useful lessons in counter piracy operations for the Gulf of Guinea 
efforts, especially antipiracy operations in Southeast Asia Regional Cooperation 
Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) 
and the Horn of Africa the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC). The negative effect 
piracy is having in the Gulf of Guinea countries and the call for a comprehensive anti-
piracy strategy to counter piracy in the region motivated the researcher to embark on this 
study. 
1.2 - Aim 
The purpose of this dissertation is to identify the challenges to the Gulf of Guinea 
countries in combating piracy and specific lessons associated with the successful factors 
and challenges of regional agreements and countermeasures against piracy in Southeast 
Asia and Horn of Africa with a view to proffering strategies. 
1.3 - Statement of the Problem  
The Gulf of Guinea is off the coast of West Africa and is a significant source of oil 
(Baldauf,2012).The wider Gulf of Guinea comprises altogether 14 countries: Angola, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, São 
Tomé and Príncipe, Cameroon, Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia and 
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Sierra Leone (Basedau & Mähler, 2011, p.74). The region provides a huge market size 
of about 300 million consumers of global trade and its maritime space facilitates 90 
percent of West African international trade of 45.5 billion US dollars and 31.62 US 
dollars of exports and imports respectively (Quashie, 2010, p.66).  
As a result of increasing piratical attacks, the Gulf of Guinea maritime space is 
becoming unsecured. For instance, the President of Benin sought the intervention of the 
United Nations (UN) to address the issue. Benin was particularly affected by the piracy 
scourge in 2011 with 20 attacks, which led to a 70 per cent drop in revenue from her 
seaports and also affected movement of commodities to some landlocked countries in 
the region.  Recently, however, the Nigerian/ Benin Maritime Operation Prosperity 
commenced to curb the activities of the pirates in Benin waters, with other current 
efforts to enhance maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.These measures have not 
been able to adequately tackle piracy and armed robbery at sea as the pirates still 
continue their activities and have even extended their operations to Togo waters.  
Further, there is a tendency for the pirates to further extend their operations to other 
countries in the region with prospects of new oil finds and weak naval capabilities. The 
Gulf of Guinea is losing about 2 billion dollars annually to piracy as earlier stated. The 
emerging piracy threat, if left unchecked, can lead to instability in the sub region and 
adversely impact on the region’s economic, social and political development. Also, the 
Gulf of Guinea vast sea area presents great challenges to the navies of the sub-region's 
member states. The weak enforcement capability of most of the navies in the Gulf of 
Guinea exposes the vulnerable sea areas to exploitation.These suggest there is still more 
to be done to suppress piracy in order to enhance maritime security. It is against this 
backdrop that the study sought answers to the following questions: 
a. In what ways can the impact of piracy on maritime security in the region 
be evaluated? 
b.  What are the current efforts to curb piracy in the region? 
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c.  Why has piracy in the region persisted despite some efforts at combating 
it?  
d.  Are there cooperative maritime arrangements existing in other regions 
relevant in providing useful insight for developing an integrated strategy 
to enhance maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea? 
1.4 - Objectives of the Study 
The main objective of the study will be to examine the different dimensions of piracy in 
the Gulf of Guinea in order to propose strategies to tackle the menace.  Specific 
objectives are to: 
a. Understand the geo-strategic importance of the Gulf of Guinea. 
b. Analyse the trend of piracy in the region. 
c. Identify factors responsible for rise in piracy in the region. 
d. Identify the impact of piracy in the region. 
e. Identify some current efforts to curb piracy. 
f. Identify challenges hampering efforts to combat piracy in the region. 
g. Identify existing cooperative arrangements that address piracy. 
h. Proffer strategies to combat piracy in order to enhance maritime security. 
This dissertation aims to serve as a reference for policymakers and stakeholders of 
member states who are responsible for defence and security within the Gulf of Guinea 
sub-region.  Additionally, the study is expected to contribute to knowledge, fill gaps in 
the literature on maritime defence and serve as resource material for future studies on 
the Gulf of Guinea maritime domain. 
1.5 - Scope  
The scope of this study is defined by its time and space.  In terms of time, the study 
covers the period between 2001 and 2012 first quarter. This period was chosen because 
of the rise of piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea especially Nigerian and 
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Benin waters. The   incidence of piracy assumed a pronounced dimension, prompting 
efforts at the national and regional levels as well as attracting the attention of the UN, 
evident in the adoption of UN Resolutions 2018 (October 2011) and 2039 (February 
2012); the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) efforts at 
activating Operation Prosperity as a pilot test to foreground a regional maritime 
framework.The space is defined by mostly the maritime space of Gulf of Guinea 
especially the waters of Nigeria and Benin .  
1.6 - Research Methods  
The research was descriptive using logical reasoning and integrated data comprising 
qualitative and quantitative data. Official documents and publications were consulted. 
Also unstructured interviews with principal staff officers of the Defence Headquarters 
and ECOWAS resource persons involved in maritime security in the Maritime Domain 
of Nigeria and West Africa were conducted. 
1.6.1 - Sources of Data  
The sources of data for the research included both primary and secondary sources of 
data.   
1.6.2 - Primary Sources of Data 
The primary data were collected through unstructured interviews, discussions and 
consultations with some principal officers of the Nigerian Defence Headquarters, Benin 
republic Navy and ECOWAS Secretariat in Abuja. The list of those interviewed is in 
Appendix A.   
1.6.3 - Secondary Sources of Data 
The secondary sources were materials gathered from books, journals, lectures notes, 
magazines, periodicals and official publications. Others include published and 
unpublished materials as well as information from the internet. In addition, official 
documents were obtained from ECOWAS and the International Maritime Bureau (IMB). 
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1.6.4 - Method of Data Analysis 
Qualitative method of data analysis was adopted using logical reasoning to arrive at 
cogent deductions. Quantitative methods involved analysis of statistical data and 
inference was made from the unstructured interviews. 
1.6.5 - Method of Data Presentation  
The analysed data was presented in a descriptive form. Tables, maps, charts and 
diagrams were also used for illustration.  
1.7 - Organization  
The research is organized into five chapters. Chapter One is the introduction where the 
objectives, research methods, research questions and the scope are stated.  Chapter Two 
reviews piracy literature in trends, development of piracy, contemporary piracy hotspots, 
and analysis of piracy incidents .It also looks at relevant factors responsible for piracy,   
impact and modus operandi of pirates in the Gulf of Guinea. Chapter Three looks at the 
current efforts to combat piracy and challenges hampering efforts to combat piracy. 
Chapter Four reviews existing regional arrangements to combat piracy and proffers 
strategies to tackle piracy. Chapter Five will contain the discussions and conclusions of 
the research. 
1.8 - Limitation of the Study 
The research was limited by inability to access some individuals programmed for 
unstructured interviews. However, secondary data were used to fill the space to ensure 
that the research objectives were achieved.   
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Chapter 2 
2 - Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea 
2.1 - Origin and Development of Piracy  
To combat the menace of piracy, it is necessary to look at the origin and basic 
development of this maritime crime. In some parts of the world piracy is seen as being 
acceptable as a way of livelihood to supplement agriculture in some cases. The 
alternative to piracy may well be hunger. Most reported pirate attacks involve the theft 
of crew belongings or ships´ equipment which may include petty cash, radios, ropes or 
even tins on paint. The perpetrators slip onboard ships in the cover of darkness and use 
little violence if there escape is impeded (Abhyankar, 2005). 
In addition, many attacks are not reported, because masters of vessels do not want any 
unnecessary delay of vessels which may cost the ship more (IMB, 2001).Further, the end 
of the cold war brought the reduction navies of North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization(NATO) and the Warsaw Pact countries. The absence of these navies 
reduced the deterrent effect on pirates especially in the South East region. Another factor 
that has fueled the development of piracy is the fact that most third world countries are 
battling under debt, which constrained there resources to acquire platforms to maintain 
presence at sea as deterrence to pirates (Abhyankar, 2005).  
2.2 - Definition of Piracy and Relationship with Maritime Security 
Any study of piracy usually raises the issue of how the term is defined particularly when 
it has to do with issues between state sovereignty and universal jurisdiction over crimes 
(Mejia, Cariou & Wolff, 2008, p.104).Recognized international law, the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, 1982) defines piracy in Article .101 as 
consisting of any of the following acts: 
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(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed 
for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private 
aircraft, and directed: 
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or 
property on board such ship or aircraft; 
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the 
jurisdiction of any State; 
   (b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft 
with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; 
   (c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in 
subparagraph (a) or (b). UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982). 
By the above definition, UNCLOS 1982 limits piracy to the two ship-model with private 
gains motive occurring at high seas (Fajriyansah, 2007, p.112). In addition, the 
definition did not take into cognizance the comprehensive legal regime of piracy within 
domestic jurisdiction (Mbiah, 2010, p.306) .The IMO, as a specialized UN agency, 
adopted the UNCLOS definition, but due to the recurrent issue of armed robbery in its 
agenda for many years came up with the term`` armed robbery against ships’’ as well 
(Mejia, 2002, p.33). Therefore, IMO in Article 2.2 of the Maritime Safety Committee 
(MSC) Circular 984, defines armed robbery against ships as “any unlawful act of 
violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of 
"piracy", directed against a ship or against persons or property on board such a ship, 
within a State’s jurisdiction over such offences’’ (IMO, 2000).  
On the other hand, Maritime Security is defined as measures employed by maritime 
administrations, vessels owners and operators, port facilities, offshore installations and 
other maritime organizations to protect against unlawful acts (Mukherjee & Mejia, 
2005).Further maritime security ensures unimpeded sea trade, safe navigation, 
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protection of coastal communities and their livelihoods and preservation of the rich 
ecosystems in the ocean vital to wellbeing of the planet (Onuoha, 2010). 
From the foregoing, maritime security has two aspects, protection of the environment 
including the ecosystem, fish, sea mammals and safety of the users such as vessels and 
operators. Hence any piratical act, like attacking a vessel laden with oil and leading to 
pollution that degrades the integrity of the marine ecosystems, is considered a threat to 
maritime security. Conversely, an act that negates the safety of operators or vessels that 
use the sea legally, also affects maritime security (Onuoha, 2010). Thus from the 
foregoing a clear link can be established between sea piracy and maritime security in the 
sense that piracy is a threat and maritime security is the desired end state. 
2.3 - Contemporary Global Piracy Hotspots  
According to IMB the three hotspots of piracy and armed robbery against ships include 
Southeast Asia, Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Guinea (Mbiah, 2007, p.127). The 
succeeding paragraphs will briefly discuss piracy in South East Asian and Somali (Horn 
of Africa) waters before looking at the Gulf of Guinea in detail. See figure 1.  
2.3.1 - Piracy in Southeast Asia  
As a result of increased piracy attacks in Southeast Asia, the IMB in 1992 established 
the Piracy Reporting Centre in Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia (Murphy, 2007, p.21). 
According to IMB statistics, cases of piracy increased drastically all over the world since 
the late 1990s. The South East Asian maritime environment had the highest number of 
piracy attacks, attributed to the 1997 Asian financial crises(Banlaoi,2005,p.62), with 
almost half taking place in the Malacca and Singapore straits, the surrounding waters of 
Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines (Kaneda, 2005, p.45).  
11 
 
Abhyankar refers to piracy in Southeast Asia as `` Asian’’ piracy. This kind of piracy 
takes place in the territories of the various countries where ships are boarded, and cash 
and valuables are stolen from the ship and crew using minimum force (Abhyankar, 
2002). Another variant of piracy committed in Southeast Asia is the theft or hijacking of 
an entire ship.  
 
This is where ships were hijacked given false identity and turning them into “phantom 
ships” with fake registration papers (Bateman, 2010, p.16). 
2.3.2 - Piracy in Somalia  
Failure of governance that resulted in the collapse of the Somali state since the ousting 
of President Siad Barre in 1991 is at the root cause of piracy in Somalia. As a result, 
Somalia’s coastline has been infested with militia groups who engage in piracy (Onuoha, 
2009, p.37).The modus operandi of Somali pirates involve the preservation of hijacked 
ship, crew and cargo to enhance bargain for ransom payment. The operators of the 
piracy model involve fishermen, militia and investors (Mejia, 2010a). According to IMB 
Figure 1:  Live Piracy Map showing hot spots(2008) 
Source:  http://bldgblog.blogspot.se/2008/11/piracy-live-at-sea.html 
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reports, the Somali pirates use “Mother Vessels” as a means of transportation to attack 
their preys (IMB, 2006). The use of pirate mother ships (fishing vessels converted to 
pirate vessels) allow the pirates to extend their attacks up to 700nm offshore for 
hijacking of ships even, oil tankers. For example three Thai fishing vessels were 
hijacked 1200nm of the coast of Somalia; the furthest reported (Geiss & Petrig, 2010, 
p.10). The extension of these attacks has caused a profound effect on sea trade and 
seafarers alike. In 2011, Somali pirates attacked 237 vessels receiving an estimated US 
dollars 160 million in ransom.  The number of hostages and vessels held reached a peak 
in February 2011, with reported 33 vessels and 733 hostages as being held by Somali 
pirates. As at 19 March 2012, 13 vessels and 197 hostages were held by pirates 
(Rhinehard, 2012, p.9). 
2.4 - Understanding the Gulf of Guinea 
Understanding the geostrategic setting of the Gulf of Guinea would be necessary before 
looking at the dynamics of piracy in the region. The Gulf of Guinea starts from Senegal 
to Angola with a distance of over 6,000 kilometer coastal arc which makes it a strategic 
geo-maritime area (Onuoha, 2012, p.4). (See figure 2). 
 
Figure 2.Map of Gulf of Guinea  
Source: 321 Energy (http://www.321energy.com/editorials/engdahl/engdahl060506.html) 
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The region is not only abundant in natural resources in oil and other hydrocarbons, but 
also fish, cocoa and timber (Crippa, 2012).According to experts, the Gulf of Guinea will 
surpass the Persian Gulf nations  in the production of oil by 2020 (Paterson, 2007). 
Estimates suggest the oil producing countries in the region will gain S200 billion from 
oil earnings and S349 billion by 2019(Onuoha, 2009, p.246).Angola and Nigeria are the 
biggest producers and have an output of around 2,000,000 barrels per day (bpd). Congo-
Brazzaville, Gabon and Equatorial-Guinea have extracted between 240,000 and 350,000 
bpd. Equatorial Guinea started its production in the mid-1990s but Gabon is a long-
standing oil producer. Cameroon’s oil production stands at about 77,000 bpd (2009). It 
is less known that both the Democratic Republic of Congo and Cote d’Ivoire are also oil 
producers. Their current output is  relatively  small with 16,400 and 57,900 bpd 
respectively ( Basedau & Mähler 2011, p.74) .Ghana, Liberia and Sierra Leone are the 
next countries to enter the oil production and export business, with new deposits 
discovered in their national waters in recent years (Crippa, 2012). 
The international geostrategic importance of the oil and gas reserves in the region is 
bigger today because the oil found in the Gulf of Guinea is of very high quality and can 
be conveniently shipped to all major markets from there (Roll, 2011, p.14).  For instance 
Nigeria supplies 10 percent of shipment of oil to the United States (Paterson, 2007). 
The ecosystem of the region is a source of global interest (Mane, 2005).Apart from oil 
16 Gulf of Guinea and ECOWAS countries make up the Guinea Large Marine 
Ecosystem (GLME) which provides nutrient rich ecosystems for fish, prawns and other 
marine mammals to thrive. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
statistics, fish production in 2010 was 800,000 tonnes for commercial, industrial, and 
subsistence fishing (Usoro, 2012, p. 56). Furthermore, the Gulf of Guinea benefits from 
the absence of narrow maritime lanes known as chokepoints that make shipping 
susceptible to blockades, pirate attacks, and shipping accidents (Mane, 2005, p.4). Hence 
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a key hub of commercial maritime activities where growing investments in the region 
mean that coastal trading and maritime traffic are bound to increase in the region. As 
such maritime crimes like piracy, armed robbery at sea, drug trafficking, poaching and 
pollution will tend to increase. The most immediate concern to maritime stakeholders 
and the shipping industry is the threat posed by piracy and armed robbery against ships 
(Onuoha, 2012, p.4). Therefore the next section analyses piracy attacks in the region 
with a view to understanding the causes, consequences and remedies that may be needed 
to put in place to secure the Gulf of Guinea. 
2.5 - Analysis of Attacks in the Gulf of Guinea  
This section evaluates the piracy incidents from 1991 to the first quarter of 2012 
(2012:Q1) based on statistics from the IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships 
Annual Reports 2000-2012. The analysis provides a framework for the kind of remedial 
actions that can be taken to combat piracy and armed robbery against ships. The analysis 
would indicate the types of ships attacked, reasons for rise and decline of pirates attacks, 
countries most affected and comparisons between countries, regions and Africa in order 
to find the proportions of incidents from various categories. 
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Table 1: Actual and Attempted Attacks against Ships in African and Gulf of Guinea waters between 1991 and 2012 (Q1) 
Africa 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total  
Algeria       1             1                       2 
Angola*     3       1 1 1 3 1   3     4 1 2     1   21 
Benin *                         1           1   20 1 23 
Cameroon*             3 5 3 2 7 5 2 4 2 1   2 3 5     44 
Congo DR*                   1 1         3 4 1 2 3 4 1 20 
Egypt       1       2 1 1 2           2     2 3   14 
Equatorial Guinea*                   1               1         2 
Eritrea                            1     1           2 
Gabon*         1     2 3 2 3 7                     18 
Ghana *         1 2 2 4 2 2 5 5 3 5 3 3 1 7 3   2 2 52 
Guinea*       1 1 2 3 2 6 6 3 2 4 5 1 4 2   5 6 5   58 
Guinea Bissau *                 1   1 2             1       5 
Gulf of Aden                   13 11 11 18 8 10 10 13 92 117 53 37 8 401 
Ivory Coast*       1   4 4 1 5 5 9 5 2 4 3 1   3 2 4 1 3 57 
Kenya               7   5   2 1 1     4 2 1   1   24 
Liberia*                         1 2     1 1   1     6 
Madagascar              1       1 3   1 1   1           8 
Mauritania                    1       2 1 1             5 
Morocco                  1 1 1       1   1 1         6 
Mozambique                    2   1 1       3 2       1 10 
Nigeria*     2   1 4 9 3 12 9 19 14 39 28 16 12 42 40 29 19 10 10 318 
Red Sea                                     15 25 39 7 86 
Senegal *           2 6 2 1   1 3 8 5                 28 
Sierra Leone *           3 3       3 1   3   2 2       1   18 
Somalia        1 14 4 5 9 14 9 8 6 3 2 35 10 31 19 80 139 160 28 577 
South Africa                    1 1   1                   3 
Tanzania      2 1 2 3 4 3 3 2 7 3 5 2 7 9 11 14 5 1   1 85 
The Congo*                 2                 1   1 3 2 9 
Togo*                   1   1 1     1   1 2   6   13 
Total(Gulf of Guinea Nations*)     5 2 4 17 31 20 36 32 53 45 64 56 25 31 53 59 48 39 53 17 690 
Total (Africa)     7 6 20 24 41 41 55 67 85 71 93 73 80 61 120 189 266 259 293 64 1915 
Source: Adapted from International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)-International Maritime Bureau (IMB) Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships 
Annual Reports 2000 – 2012 
*Gulf of Guinea Nations 
*Q1- First Quarter 
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2.5.1- Trend Analysis 
According to statistics from the International Chamber of Commerce- International 
Maritime Bureau (ICC-IMB) Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships Annual reports, 
there were a total of 1,915 pirate attacks in Africa between 1991-2012 first quarter, see 
Table 1  showing ``Actual and Attempted Attacks against Ships in African   and Gulf of 
Guinea waters between 1991 - 2012 (first quarter)’’. As indicated in the table, there was 
a gradual increase of attacks from 1996, with a double rise in 2007 and steady increase 
till 2011. The figures rose from 120 in 2007 to 293 in 2011. This rise was attributed to 
piracy off the Somalia coast, Gulf of Aden and Nigerian waters.  
The Gulf of Guinea which is the focus of this dissertation accounted for 690 of the 1,915 
attacks in African waters between 1991-2012 first quarter. This figure indicated a rise in 
piracy and shows an uneven trend of attacks in the Gulf of Guinea. There were no 
reported attacks of piracy in 1991 and 1992 in the Gulf of Guinea. However, in 1993, 5 
attacks were reported, that is 2 in Nigeria and 3 in Angola. Only 2 attacks were reported 
in 1994 which rose to 4 in 1995. From this author`s personal experience in counter-
piracy operations in Nigeria during the 1990s, it was widely accepted that the low 
prevalence of piracy attacks could be attributed to the active presence and high 
operational state of most naval forces in the region especially the Nigerian Navy. The 
Nigerian Navy fleet at the time was highly operational and used for ECOWAS 
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) Peace Support Operations in Liberia 1990-1999 and 
Sierra Leone 1991-2002. 
Reported attacks tripled to 17 in 1996, with a sharp rise to 31 in 1997 and dropped to 20 
in 1998. The figures started an upward trend to 36 in 1999 and down to 32 in 2000. 
Between 1996 and 2000, Nigeria had 37 attacks, followed by the Ivory Coast and 
Guinea with 19 each, Cameroon 13, Ghana 12, and Senegal 11.  In 2001, Nigeria, the 
Ivory Coast and Cameroon with 19, 9, 7 attacks respectively accounted for 36 out of the 
53 attacks that year. The attacks dropped to 45 in the Gulf of Guinea in 2002. However, 
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in 2003, 64 attacks were recorded, which was the highest since 1993. Nigeria waters had 
39 attacks and according to IMB were regarded as the most dangerous area in Africa for 
piracy and armed robbery against ships. However, 2003 saw a drop in attacks in 
Cameroon, Gabon and the Ivory Coast. 
 Looking at the table, there was a steep rise in attacks in Nigeria waters from 1993 to 
2003. This could be attributed to deterioration of the Nigerian Navy Fleet endurance 
patrol capacity as most of the ships could not be repaired after their long deployment for 
the ECOMOG peace support mission. This situation affected the operational capability 
of Nigerian Navy ships and hence left most part of the Nigerian territorial waters 
unpatrolled favoring rise of piracy (Usoro, 2012, p.55). 
With 28 attacks in Nigeria out of 56 reported in 2004, Nigeria was still regarded as the 
most dangerous area for piracy in Africa and third in the world aside Indonesia and the 
Malacca Straits. This was due to the increasing intensity of militant attacks in the Niger 
Delta region (Nincic, 2009). The Gulf of Guinea recorded 25 attacks in 2005 and 31 
attacks in 2006. Incidence of attacks in Nigerian waters witnessed a decline from 16 in 
2005 to 12 in 2006.According to IMB, this drastic reduction was attributed to increased 
law enforcement patrols and international pressure on some governments to act and 
increased awareness and anti-piracy watches by ship Masters in risk prone areas. The 
US government at the time gave Nigeria 4 warships between 2003 and 2004 to enhance 
her patrol duties against pirates (Usoro, 2012, p.55). 
However, According to IMB, Nigeria had the most kidnapped victims in 2006, 49 
against foreign oil workers. Local politics in Nigeria had an impact in shipping that year. 
This shows that whenever there is reduction in patrol, there is increase in piracy and vice 
versa. There was significant increase to 53 attacks in 2007 and 59 in 2008 in the Gulf of 
Guinea. Nigeria was responsible for a total of 82 attacks for the two years. According to 
IMB, this rise was attributed to increase in militant activities in the Niger Delta region of 
Nigeria, where the Movement of Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) was carrying 
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out attacks to protest the marginalization of the Niger Delta. The Niger Delta pirates 
attacked vessels successfully using`` mother vessels’’  further out at sea as well as being 
better armed, organized and coupled with absence of proper law enforcement. The rise 
indicated a breakdown in the law enforcement capability of the country to address the 
problem. In 2008 most attacks occurred in the territorial waters. By 2007, most of the 
vessels obtained from the US were due for refit and thus affected their patrol capabilities 
(Usoro, 2012, p.59). 
There was a decline in 2009 and 2010 to 48 and 39 attacks respectively. According to 
IMB reports, this was partly due to acquisition of new patrol boats and increased patrols 
by the Nigerian Navy and the granting of amnesty to the Niger Delta militants in August 
2009. The militants submitted most of their arms used in criminal activities. As a result 
of aggressive patrols, piracy spilled into neighboring states especially Benin. The 
increase of attacks to 53 in 2011 was attributed to the Niger Delta militants that rejected 
the Nigerian government amnesty offer. Ten reports were received for Nigeria and an 
increase in attacks in Benin to 20. It is interesting to note that from 1991 to 2010, Benin 
had only 2 attacks. According to IMB reports, the upsurge in piracy attacks in Benin was 
suspected to be carried out by pirates from Nigerian waters. Mohammed lends credence 
to this statement and confirmed the assistance of Nigeria to tackle the pirates 
(I.Mohammed, personal communication, September 10, 2012).  
The pirates always operated in gang style fashion. According to the IMB Director,  “The 
attacks off West Africa follow a different modus operandi from pirate activity in other 
parts of the world” (International Chamber of Commerce, 2012). A case in point was the 
attack on Energy Centurion Tanker on 28 August 2012, which coincided with the UN 
backed ECOWAS Maritime Security Conference, taking place in Togo at the time. 
Pirates in Togo hijacked the tanker Energy Centurion with the 24 Russian crew on board 
and siphoned 3000 tons of the gas oil cargo. They did not ask for ransom, but took the 
crew’s valuables. The vessel was seized 27km off the coast of Lome, Togo´s capital 
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.The hijackers steamed off with the tanker after a gunfight with the Togolese navy patrol 
(Lowe, 2012). 
 Pirates’ attacks severely affected Benin economy and prompted the establishment of a 
joint patrol codenamed Operation Prosperity by Nigeria and Benin navies. According to 
IMB reports, first quarter of 2012, saw 10 reports of attacks in Nigeria, the same as 
reported for the whole of 2011, and one reported for Benin, which has been attributed to 
Nigerian pirates. The reduction in the number of attacks was due to the joint patrol effort 
of the Benin – Nigerian Navies. The trend of piracy attacks shows a correlation between 
patrol efforts and presence of the Nigerian Navy fleet at sea.  
2.5.2 - Total incidents in the Gulf of Guinea  
This subsection puts the absolute number of incidents described above in charts and 
graphs for better appreciation .Figure 3 shows trend of attacks actual and attempted 
combined in the Gulf of Guinea from 1991 till first quarter of 2012. As described above, 
there is an uneven trend with piracy and armed robbery at sea in the region. The chart 
shows a steep rise of attacks from 1991 to 2003 (when it recorded the climax of 
incidents accounting for about 9.3% of the total attacks within the period under review). 
In 2004, there was a slight decrease in attacks which further decreased the following 
year, but peaked again in 2006 with steady increase making another climax in 2008. A 
gradual drop in attacks was recorded from 2009 to 2010, but, increased again in 2011. 
Nevertheless, the first quarter of 2012 recorded about 2.5% of the attacks within the 
period and has already surpassed 1991 – 1995 incidents, currently standing at about 
32.1% of the total incidents recorded in 2011. This indicates that if proper mechanisms 
are not put in place, 2012 may be worse hit by pirates’ attacks than 2011.  
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Figure 3: Total Incidents in the Gulf of Guinea from 1991-2012(Q1) (Source: ICC-IMB, Annual Piracy 
Reports, 2000-2012.) 
 
2.5.3 - Total incidents in the Gulf of Guinea by Country  
Figures 4 and 5 shows the amount of attacks in percentage with respect to the countries 
within the region. From 1991-2012(Q1), Nigeria recorded the highest  number of piracy 
incidents, accounting for about 46.1% of the entire attacks over the period; this was 
followed by Guinea (8.4%), the Ivory Coast (8.3%), Ghana (7.5%), and Cameroon 
(6.4%). However, Equatorial Guinea recorded the least attacks at about 0.3% of the total 
attacks over the period.  
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Figure 4: Total Incidents in the Gulf of Guinea by Country (Source: ICC-IMB, Annual Piracy Reports, 
2000-2012.) 
 
 
Figure 5: Total Incidents in the Gulf of Guinea by Country (Source: ICC-IMB, Annual Piracy Reports, 
2000-2012.) 
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2.5.4 - Total incidents in the Gulf of Guinea by Country in 2011  
Figure 6 and 7 show the trend of attacks in 2011. This year is particularly interesting 
because Benin republic experienced a new phenomenon of piracy, which seriously 
affected her economy (see cost of piracy). She accounted for   37.7% of the attacks in 
2011; as explained earlier, these attacks prompted the President of Benin to seek the 
urgent response of the UN that culminated to UNSC Resolutions 2018 and 2039 and the 
establishment Joint Maritime patrol Operation Prosperity. Nigeria recorded (18.9%), 
Togo (11.3%) and Guinea (9.4%). However, countries like Cameroon, Equatorial 
Guinea, Gabon, Guinea Bissau, Liberia and Senegal did not record any incident in 2011. 
 
 
Figure 6: Total Incidents in the Gulf of Guinea by Country for 2011 (Source: ICC-IMB, Annual Piracy 
Report, 2012.) 
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Figure 7: Total Incidents in the Gulf of Guinea by Country for 2011 (Source: ICC-IMB, Annual Piracy 
Report 2012.) 
2.5.5 - Reported incidents in Africa and the Gulf of Guinea  
Figure 8 show an extensive evaluation of the piracy incidents in Africa and the Gulf of 
Guinea.The Gulf of Guinea accounted for about 71.4% of the piracy attacks in Africa in 
1993, which dropped drastically to 20% in 1995, with a sharp surge to 70.8% in 1996 
which increased to 75.6% the next year. Although 2003 witnessed the highest piracy 
incidents in the Gulf of Guinea, 2004 recorded the greatest contribution (76.7%) to 
attacks from the region when compared to Africa. Nevertheless, the proportion of piracy 
incidents from the Gulf of Guinea has been reducing gradually since 2005, with the Gulf 
of Guinea accounting for about 26.6% of the incidents in the first quarter of 2012.  
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Figure 8: Reported Incidents in Africa and the Gulf of Guinea (Source: ICC-IMB, Annual Piracy Reports, 
2000-2012.) 
2.5.6 - Reported incidents in the Gulf of Guinea and Nigeria 
Figure 9 reveals the proportion of piracy incidents in the Gulf of Guinea that came from 
Nigeria. By 1993, Nigeria accounted for about 40% of the incidents in the Gulf of 
Guinea, which dropped to zero (0%) by 1994, rose again to 25% in 1995; and fluctuating 
between 15% (1998) and 64% (2005). By 2007, Nigeria recorded the highest incidents 
of attacks and accounted for about 79.2% of the attacks in the Gulf of guinea. 
Nevertheless, this reduced gradually to 18.9% in 2011. However, considering 2012 
separately, Nigeria accounted for about 58.8% of the attacks in the Gulf of Guinea for 
the first quarter of 2012 already. 
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Figure 9 Reported Incidents in the Gulf of Guinea and Nigeria (Source: ICC-IMB, Annual Piracy Reports, 
2000-2012.) 
 
2.5.7 - Reported incidents between Africa the Gulf of Guinea and Nigeria 
Figure 10 show the comparison of attacks between Africa, the Gulf of Guinea and 
Nigeria. In general, piracy incidents in Africa, the Gulf of Guinea and Nigeria shared a 
similar trend from 1991 to 2006, with a gradual increase from 1995 to 2003, and a 
decrease in 2004 down to 2006. Nevertheless, while cases in Africa rose in 2007 to a 
record high in 2011, incidents in the Gulf of Guinea and Nigeria increased slightly in 
2007 and also decreased steadily till 2010. Meanwhile, in 2011 piracy cases rose in the 
Gulf of Guinea as Nigeria recorded a continued decrease from 2010.   
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Figure 10. Reported Incidents between Africa, the Gulf of Guinea and Nigeria (Source: ICC-IMB, Annual 
Piracy Reports, 2000-2012.) 
 
2.5.8 - Reported incidents between Africa, the Gulf of Guinea, Nigeria and Somalia 
Figure 11 show a rise in piracy incidents in Africa, while attacks in the Gulf of Guinea 
and Nigeria experienced a downward trend, incidents in Somalia rose to a record high in 
2011 accounting for about 54.6% of the total attacks in Africa at the time. 
 
Figure 11: Reported Incidents in Africa, the Gulf of Guinea, Nigeria and Somalia (Source: ICC-IMB, 
Annual Piracy Reports, 2000-2012.) 
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2.5.9 - Summary of Analysis of Attacks 
The following conclusions can be made from the analysis of incidents: 
Nigeria had the highest number of attacks (318) in the region during the period under 
review. The findings indicated certain factors were attributed for the high number of 
attacks. These include violent attacks carried out by armed Niger Delta militants from 
Nigeria as a result of crisis in the Niger Delta region and poor operational state of most 
Nigerian Navy ships. There was a strong correlation between naval patrols (maritime 
security) and piracy. On the other hand, drop in piracy was also associated with social 
programmes such as the amnesty programme instituted by Nigerian government. Other 
measures that reduced piracy included international pressure, anti- piracy watches by 
ship crews as well as acquisition of new naval platforms used for sustained patrols. 
Therefore, apart from military measures, piracy could also be suppressed by socio-
political means and adoption of best management practices by ships. 
The findings also revealed that piracy is a transnational crime. The reduction in piracy in 
Nigeria led to increase in another country, Benin and further extended to Togo. This 
goes to show a regional approach in the form of a combined patrol and regional 
agreement would be necessary to combat piracy and sea robbery. In addition pirates 
seeking safe haven in other countries, could be stopped by arresting criminals if 
adequate legislations are in place. A regional agreement could provide the platform for 
hot pursuit and extradition. The analysis opens up challenges faced by countries in the 
region. For example lack of naval capacity and poor technological base for repair of 
ships. The subsequent sections will discuss in details some factors and impact of piracy 
as well as the challenges faced by the region in combating piracy.  
2. 6 - Factors responsible for rise in Piracy 
Before commanders go to battle, a thorough assessment of the enemy’s strength and 
weaknesses must be made in order to ensure victory. In this circumstance, it is important 
that the causes and reasons for piracy are understood so that appropriate suggestions are 
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made to tackle the maritime crime. Hence, there are several interrelated factors 
responsible for the persistence of piracy. This section will look at some of these factors 
peculiar to the Gulf of Guinea. 
2.6.1 - Conflict and Disorder 
Piracy and criminal activities flourish in coastal areas where there is civil strife and 
disorder, or their aftermath (Murphy, 2009, p.168). West Africa has witnessed many 
conflicts. The region remains fragile with Cote d’Ivoire recovering from civil war, and 
crisis in Guinea and Guinea Bissau (Dokubo, 2010, p.144). The menace of piracy in 
Nigeria is traced to the Niger Delta region. The Movement for the Emancipation of the 
Niger Delta  became a coalition of local groups of militants protesting marginalization in 
Nigeria. The militants attacked vessels and oil platforms in and around the Niger Delta. 
Over time, it became almost impossible to establish whether a piracy incident was 
politically or criminally motivated as the perpetrators often operated interchangeably 
(Crippa, 2011).  Drug trafficking is another maritime crime fitting together with piracy 
in the Gulf of Guinea. The Gulf of Guinea is becoming a major hub where a sizeable   
amount of cocaine was seized around Cape Verde, the Canary Islands and Madeira in 
vessels manned by crews from the sub-region (Gilpin, 2007). This state of conflict and 
disorder tends to fuel piracy. 
2.6.2 - Underfunded Law Enforcement/Inadequate Security 
Many states are financially constrained to sustain navies, coast guards that can patrol the 
length and breadth of their maritime environment thereby encouraging pirates to operate 
with impunity (Murphy, 2009, p.168).These weak internal security forces, which are 
under-trained, poorly equipped, incapable of effectively policing their internal waters, 
are also badly in need of education on human rights (Goldwyn & Morrison, 2005).  
Pirates take advantage of these shortcomings to commit crimes illegal activities 
(Ibrahim, 2009, p.127).  
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2.6.3 - Poor Governance and Permissive Political Environment 
Poor governance is a factor that has fuelled rising incidences of insecurity in the region. 
The social and economic upheaval that followed bad governance undermined national 
and sub-regional security (Alli, 2010, p.70). To that end, and to promote good 
governance and security in Africa, Dr Mo Ibrahim, a wealthy Sudanese mobile 
communication businessman established a five million United States dollar prize for the 
African President adjudged to be the best in terms of good governance (Alli, 2010, 
p.70). Furthermore, piracy thrives where there are weak laws and lax law enforcement as 
a result of a weak state. Permissive environments exist within states and their territorial 
waters because the political environment is corrupt or allow illegal activity to take place 
for its benefit, or because law enforcement is underfunded and as a result a criminal 
organization can develop. The likelihood is that corrupt law enforcement officials are a 
feature of all areas affected by piracy (Murphy, 2010, p.169). 
2.6.4 - Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons 
Illicit small arms and light weapons used by criminal gangs have intensified the lethality 
of armed violence in West Africa (Golwa, 2010, p .119). The proliferation of small arms 
in West Africa is as a consequence of current and past conflict zones, corrupt law 
enforcement and military personnel selling their weapons as well as domestic artisan 
production from Senegal, Guinea, Ghana and Nigeria which passes down established 
routes (Dokubo, 2010, p.145). For example there were an estimated 75,000 illegal craft 
guns circulating in Ghana, constituting the vast majority of the 125,000 unregistered 
weapons in the country (Kieli, 2008, p.7). Similarly, the Nigerian Maritime 
Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) raised alarm over the influx of illegal 
arms into Nigerian waters by some shipping firms involved in unauthorized mid-stream 
discharge. The Director General of NIMASA explained that most of these arms and 
ammunition are the same arms used by Niger Delta pirates and oil thieves (Oritse, 
2012). 
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2.6.5 - Unemployment and Poverty 
Failure of poor government policies to provide basic necessities has made unemployed 
youths ready hands for violent or criminal organizations.  For instance, in Sierra Leone 
where despite disarmament, the unemployed youths still jumped at another opportunity 
to pick up arms in the Liberian Civil war (Dokubo, 2010, p.143).To support the earlier 
mentioned statement, Mbiah (2007) describes paucity of legitimate employment 
opportunities and general lack of regional economic development as a pull factor that 
have encouraged coastal inhabitants to partake in crimes like maritime piracy (Mbiah, 
2007, p.130). However, though statistics are unreliable, there is general agreement that 
around 51 percent of the Niger Delta’s people still live on $2 or less a day, only 49 
percent have access to safe drinking water and there is one secondary school for every 
14,679 children (Newsom, 2011, p.5). These conditions could push individuals into 
unproductive ventures. Table 2 illustrates the relative medium to low living standards in 
the region which could indicate fertile ground for criminal acts like piracy.  
Table 2: Human Development Index in the Gulf of Guinea 
Country 
Human Development Index (HDI) 
 HDI- 2009 HDI-2010 HDI-2011 
Ranks (general level)   
Angola 143 (medium) 146(low) 148( low) 
Congo-Kinshasa 176 (low) 168(low) 187(low) 
Congo-Brazzaville 136 (medium) 126( medium) 137(medium) 
Gabon 103 (medium) 93(medium) 106(medium) 
Equatorial Guinea 118 (medium) 117(medium) 136 (medium) 
Sao Tome 131 (medium) 127(medium) 144( low) 
Cameroon 153 (medium) 131(low) 150(low) 
Nigeria 158 (medium) 142(low) 156(low) 
Benin 161 (low) 134(low) 167(low) 
Togo 159 (low) 139(low) 162 (low) 
Ghana 152 (medium) 130(low) 135 (medium) 
Cote d’Ivoire 163 (medium) 149(low) 170 (low) 
Liberia 169 (low) 162(low) 182(low) 
Sierra Leone 180 (low) 158(low) 180(low) 
 
(Sources: Basedau, M., & Mähler, A. (2011); Human Development Index Reports (2010-2011)) 
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2.6.7 - Promise of Reward 
The great financial reward of pirate activity has arisen as a motivator for this crime 
(Otto, 2011). The promise of comfort and expensive cars often lure unemployed youths 
to engage in piracy which has become a thriving business. (Nincic, 2009, p.7). 
According to the confession of the alleged leader of the hijack of MT Energy Centurion 
recently arrested, financiers of cargo oil theft business in Nigeria promised his gang 16 
million naira( about102,000 US dollars) to hijack an oil tanker( Bilesanmi & 
Amata,2012). Murphy (2010) notes that piracy is a low risk high paying job when 
compared to other lines of work, pirates qualify for (Murphy, 2010). 
2.6.8 - Favourable Geography 
Favorable geography facilitates and even provides safe havens for pirates (Murphy, 
2007, p.14). The geography of the Nigerian Delta region with many creeks and swamps, 
make the region extremely difficult to police and thus enables pirates to escape after 
committing illegalities (Ukeje, 2009, p.8). 
2.6.9 - Crude Oil Theft and Illicit Bunkering 
Fuelling piracy are organized crime syndicates operating major crude theft operations 
from the Niger Delta in Nigeria. They are backed by well-armed and increasingly well-
financed militias (David & Morrison, 2005). In addition, the complex geography of the 
region, with a labyrinthine network comprising thousands of creeks and swamps and 
existence of an established international market for stolen oil which involves partners in 
the Gulf of Guinea (Cote D’Ivoire, Gambia, Liberia, Sao Tome and Principe) 
encourages illicit bunkering providing cash or exchange for weapons (Obasi, 2011,p.59). 
2.7 - Modus Operandi of Pirates 
If any cooperative arrangement is going to be made to tackle piracy in the Gulf of 
Guinea, it would be essential to know the modus operandi of the pirates. 
32 
 
In the Gulf of Guinea, piracy has moved over the years from low-level armed robberies 
to hijackings, cargo thefts, and large-scale robberies.  Pirates often take hijacked tankers 
to another empty tanker to collect its siphoned fuel to be sold on the black market. The 
original vessel is then brought back and released (McNamee, 2012). A case in point 
according to IMB 2011 report, took place on 13 September 2011, where a product tanker 
MT Mattheos 1, was hijacked and attacked by armed pirates around 62 nautical miles 
from Benin coast. The pirates took hostage of all the 23 crew members and hijacked the 
tanker. They forced the master to sail to an unknown location, where the tanker was 
ransacked and some items stolen. The pirates released the vessel after a few days. 
 With respect to the above-mentioned, pirate attacks are often violent and are carried out 
by assailants armed with automatic weapons and using different types of small boats. 
Most of the attacks are targeted at expatriates, many of whom are kidnapped for ransom 
(Fouché, 2010a, p.154; IMB, 2006, p.17). In the words of Lieutenant General Victor 
Malu, a former Nigeria Chief of Army Staff: 
The boys in the creeks of Niger Delta operate with military precision and with all 
the modern weapons of warfare. The skills with which they use these weapons of 
warfare make people to believe that insiders and some influential people at the 
top are behind them. More daring is the fact that these boys operate with satellite 
phones to ease communication. They have modern guns and other high-tech 
weapons and that is why they easily defy security. They are very strategic in their 
activities. (Idehen, 2008, p.477). 
The numerous attacks and hijackings of ships taking place in the Gulf of Guinea such as 
the attack on MT Mattheos 1 are labeled as major criminal attacks by IMB reports. 
According to Beckman (2002), this kind of criminal attack involves detailed planning 
and organization. The attack can be described as a major transnational organized crime 
at sea and are very serious because they involve great losses to ship owners, risk to lives 
of crew and navigational safety (Beckman, 2002, p. 321).The IMB reports also state 
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many attacks occur at ports, anchorages and coastal waters under the jurisdiction of Gulf 
of Guinea coastal states. For example IMB 2007 report, specify 13 attacks against 
anchored ships in Benin waters. By the definition of piracy in UNCLOS 1982, many of 
these attacks cannot be classified as piracy, which as discussed earlier occurs at high 
seas or the Exclusive Economic Zone. Therefore UNCLOS 1982 will inadequate to try 
suspected pirates in territorial waters. 
In 1985, an Italian Cruise liner Achille Lauro was hijacked by a Palestinian armed 
terrorist group. The terrorists took control of the vessel and demanded for the release of 
their confederates in Israel prisons. In course of the hijacking, an unarmed and disabled 
passenger was killed and thrown overboard. This incident led IMO to develop the 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation (SUA) 1988 (Mejia, 2007, p.173). According to Hesse (2007), the SUA 
Convention provides the legal basis for action to be taken against persons committing 
unlawful acts against ships, including seizure of ships by force, acts of violence against 
persons on board ships, and the placing of devices likely to cause damage or destroy the 
ship (Hesse, 2007,p.193). As earlier described, serious hijackings, seizures, exercise of 
control by force and hostage taking against ships in the Gulf of Guinea could come 
under the purview of offences of the 1988 SUA Convention. The SUA Convention is an 
enabling law to repress serious pirate attacks in the Gulf of Guinea. The next section will 
discuss the cost and impact of the operations of these pirates in the Gulf of Guinea. 
2. 8 - Economic Cost and Impact of Piracy 
In terms of cost of piracy, One Earth Future Working Paper  (2010) analyses the direct 
economic costs of piracy, which include the following: the cost of ransoms, piracy 
insurance premiums, deterrent equipment, re-routing vessels away from piracy risk 
zones, naval deployments in piracy hot zones and  piracy prosecutions (Bowden,2010). 
This section will look at the relevant costs of piracy to the Gulf of Guinea. 
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2.8.1 - Cost of Insurance 
In reaction to the growing threat and cost of ransoms, the maritime insurance industry 
has responded by increasing its shipping rates and premiums, especially in designated 
high-risk piracy zones ((Bowden,2010).).  Following increased attacks in the Gulf of 
Guinea, the Joint War Committee, representing Lloyd’s of London underwriters and 
other insurers, listed Nigeria, and Benin as higher risk for shipping on August 1, 2011. 
The Nigerian risk zone now extends to 200 nautical miles. This implies additional cost 
for ships entering Nigeria and Benin waters (Bockmann, 2011). Further, The 
International Bargaining Forum, a body of seafarers, has warned its members to avoid 
Nigerian waters as they declared the country ‘high risk area’ too with effect from April 
2012 following increased attacks on vessels and crew members. This also has a 
damaging cost implication on shipment into Nigeria and Benin waters (Oritse, 2012).  
2.8.2 - Cost to Food Price Inflation 
Approximately 40% of piracy attacks have been on bulk carriers and general cargo 
vessels. Pirate attacks on these vessels have direct effect on the price of food staples 
which bulk carriers have as deliveries of food cargo is delayed, or in the case of 
perishable goods, lost (Bowden, 2010, p.22).  To support this statement, Figure 12 
shows the number of attacks by ship types. The most attacked ships in order of 
frequency are bulk carriers, general cargo, tanker crude oil, chemical product and fishing 
trawlers. Bulk carriers may be targeted probably because they have low freeboards 
(short distance and the deck) (Murphy, 2010, p.46). Interestingly, there are apparently no 
reported attacks on warships, probably because they are armed vessels.  
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Figure 12: Attacks by Ship Types from 1991 to 2011 (Source: ICC-IMB, Annual Piracy Reports, 2000-
2012.) 
 
2.8.3 - Cost of Reduced Foreign Revenue 
Piracy can have significant cost on foreign revenue (Bowden, 2010) .All these pirates’ 
attacks and other maritime crimes have resulted in Countries of the Gulf of Guinea 
losing $2 billion annually. For instance, Benin saw a 70% decrease in 2011 in the 
number of ships entering its main port of Cotonou, which carries 90% of Benin’s trade, 
representing 80% of the government’s budget (McNamee, 2012). Further piracy affected 
Benin’s trade with landlocked States, including Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger that 
depend on Cotonou port, which is one of the major transit ports servicing these 
landlocked States (UNSC, 2012a). 
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Similarly, Nigeria’s oil industry and ships directly targeted by Niger Delta militants 
witnessed a drop in oil production by around 20% in 2006. Nigeria was losing 10% of its 
daily oil output (approximately 100,000 barrels) valued at $1.5 million every day at the 
time (Bowden, 2010).Due to volatility of regions affected by piracy, foreign investors 
may look for alternative regions to invest their money. For instance if Ghana does not 
adequately protect its waters, her tourism industry might be affected (Bowden, 2010).  
2.8.4 - Cost of Naval Deterrence 
The Nigeria and Benin republic joint maritime patrol is costing Benin an estimated 
$466,000 US Dollars per month, which is equivalent to 5 per cent of the total cost of the 
operation, of which Nigeria is bearing 95 per cent of the logistical support cost (UNSC, 
2012a, p.6). 
2.8. 5 - Impact on Seafarers 
The cost of piracy is not purely economic (Murphy, 2010, p.54). According to IMB 
reports, between 2000 and 2011, 1,214 seafarers suffered some form of violence in the 
Gulf of Guinea. For instance, Benin had 140 seafarers taken hostage in 2011, which was 
the second highest number in the world after Somalia. The impact of piracy on humans 
cannot be quantified, because some seafarers may have varying levels of long term 
distress even after violence on them (Hurlburt & Mody, 2012, p.11). Seafarers even on 
large ships are apprehensive and even afraid when they pass through pirate prone areas. 
Those that have suffered attacks are unwilling to return to sea (Murphy, 2010, p.54). 
Fortunately, most victims are able to recover after treatment from health care 
professionals (Hurlburt & Mody, 2012, p.11). Apart from the seafarers themselves, their 
families and friends are even traumatized by long periods of agony, thinking of their 
loved ones in captivity or even being killed. All the above experiences make the human 
cost of piracy incalculable. 
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2.8.6 - Potential Environmental Impact 
Piracy can cause environmental and navigational hazards as a result of violent attacks on 
ships carrying liquid petroleum cargoes. During a piracy attack, a ship may be 
completely taken over and the crew locked up in a central place, leaving the ship without 
a helmsman to steer, and as a result end up colliding with another ship (Talley & Rule, 
2008, p.93). For instance a tugboat, Lamnalco Waxbill, in the Niger Delta in Nigeria, 
was attacked and the crew abducted by gunmen. The vessel was later found drifting with 
a dead body onboard (Onuoha & Hassan, 2009, p. 19). 
Furthermore, a spike in violence in the Niger Delta in Nigeria or attacks on super tankers 
might shoot up oil prices by $10 or more per barrel. The possibilities of terrorist attacks 
are there because Nigeria’s growing Liquefied Natural Gas sector large multi-billion 
dollar facilities could be conspicuous new potential targets (Goldwyn & Morrison, 
2005).  
2.8.7 - Political Impact 
Piracy can have a damaging effect on the political image of a country. A country could 
be termed as weak and incapable of protecting lives and properties through its law 
enforcement agencies causing embarrassment to the nation on the international scene. In 
addition, the crime demoralizes the citizens and gives false sense of power to the pirates 
over security agencies (Ekpeyong, 1983). The Benin government was unable to function 
in the short term as a result of piracy. This situation also hampered its efforts to 
consolidate democratic governance, and attract foreign investments in Benin’s oil fields 
(UNSC, 2012a, p.6). 
2.8.8 - Impact on Fishing 
The fishing industry was greatly affected by piracy in Nigeria. It reached the point that 
many captains of fishing vessels refused to put sea (Nincic, 2009).As a consequence, in 
2008, over 170 Nigerian fishing vessels were idle due to the piracy risk, which 
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threatened about 50,000 jobs. Nigeria lost about $600 million in export earnings due to 
piracy threats to its fisheries (Bowden, 2010).   
Further, prices of seafood increased astronomically as a result of the scarcity of fish, 
thereby an important protein source was out of the reach of most of the average citizens 
(Nincic, 2009). Nigerian pirates also caused similar piracy problems among fishermen 
elsewhere in the Gulf of Guinea (Nincic, 2009). In 2011, Benin was experiencing a 
monthly loss of $1 million in its fishing sector (UNSC, 2012a). 
2.9 -  Conclusion 
From the analysis of this section, piracy is encouraged by interrelated factors and causes. 
The promise of reward was identified as an easy way for pirates especially Niger Delta 
militants to make money. This situation is probably accentuated by high unemployment 
and poverty pervading many Gulf of Guinea countries. In addition, crisis prone areas 
coupled with disorder encouraged the persistence of piracy. A classic example is the 
Niger Delta crisis in Nigeria. The Niger Delta geographical feature makes it even easier 
for pirates to escape after attacking ships. The lack of adequate platforms of the law 
enforcement agents makes it difficult to pursue them.  
The high number of illicit small arms sourced from illegal oil proceeds for example 
emboldened pirates to attack ships especially oil tankers, bulk carriers and fishing 
vessels. These attacks have had huge impacts on prices of food commodities, shipping 
costs, reduced revenue for the region and trauma on seafarers. The modus operandi of 
the pirates which involve violence especially assault, hostage taking suggest the 
appropriateness of the SUA Convention to repress piracy in the region. The relevance of 
this section brings to fore the wider implications of not combating piracy. Hence the 
next chapter looks at efforts in combating piracy and the challenges hampering these 
efforts. 
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Chapter 3 
3 - Assessment of Current Efforts to Combat Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea 
Following increased piracy attacks, there have been numerous engagements at national, 
bilateral, multilateral, regional and international levels to combat piracy and secure the 
maritime environment of the Gulf of Guinea. This section will discuss some of the 
measures in the succeeding paragraphs. 
3.1 - National Measures 
 At the national level, for instance, the Nigerian government established in January 
2012, a Joint Maritime Task Force led by army officer, known as Operation Pulo Shield, 
which was transformed from Operation Restore Hope initially established to tackle 
militancy in the Niger Delta .The Operation Pulo Shield is mandated to combat piracy, 
armed robbery at sea and crude oil theft among other crimes (Onuoha, 2012, p10). 
According to Udoh, “the Nigerian Army recently acquired some flat bottom boats to 
enhance the operational effectiveness of the amphibious units in the Operation Pulo 
Shield. However the Joint Task Force is challenged by the large expanse of area to patrol 
coupled with the organization and sophistication of the pirates” (E.Udoh, personal 
communication, September 3, 2012). 
On the other hand, the Nigerian Navy hierarchy has set out a transformation programme 
to acquire a new mix of warships to enhance maritime security. For instance, between 
January and April 2012, the newly acquired Nigerian Navy Ship Thunder which was 
deployed for intensive patrol duties arrested over seven ships with illegal consignments 
(Bashir, 2012). 
Further, of blessed memory, Alhaji Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, deceased President of 
Nigeria in 2007, introduced the amnesty programme for Niger Delta Militants in 2009. 
This amnesty programme drastically reduced piratical attacks in 2009 as indicated in the 
IMB reports, as many of the militants responsible for piracy surrendered their arms and 
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embraced the programme. According to Onuoha (2012) over 15 000 militants lay down 
their  arms and ammunition including about 2,760 various guns, 287, 445 ammunitions , 
18 gunboats, 763 dynamites, 1,090 dynamite caps, 3,155 magazines and other  military  
items ( Onuoha ,2012,p.7)  . 
It is instructive to note that the current President, GoodLuck Jonathan, is implementing 
the amnesty programme to the letter. Hence, the recent drop of piracy in Nigerian 
waters. The success of the programme changed the fortunes of oil production in Nigeria 
from a low 700,000 barrels per day to the current level of 2.6million barrels per day. The 
militants, who have made the waterways unsafe have all been evacuated from the creeks 
and have been rehabilitated at various institutions in Nigeria and abroad. A total of 5,204 
ex-militants are currently undergoing various forms of skills acquisition training, while 
6,280 delegates had already been processed for deployment to local and foreign training 
institutions. The rehabilitation of the militants has resulted in the creating relative peace 
and security in the region (``Fast-tracking’’, 2012). 
Similarly, according to Balogun, “the Nigerian Air force has signed a memorandum of 
understanding with NIMASA for the aerial patrol of Nigeria waters to report real time 
suspicious activities at sea. This is similar to the Eyes in the Sky initiative that was 
launched to support the antipiracy efforts of Malaysia-Singapore-Indonesia coordinated 
Patrols in South East Asia (Storey, 2008, p.116). However political issues might arise if 
the wrong persons are attacked by warplanes suspected to be carrying out illegal 
activities. This is because it would be difficult to differentiate between a militant or 
pirate” (N. Balogun, personal communication, September 4, 2012). 
Elsewhere in Ghana, the Navy took delivery of four new patrol ships as part of efforts to 
boost the naval fleet. The late President J.E.A. Mills emphasized at the commissioning 
of the Ghana navy ships that “With the increasing incidents of piracy and other related 
maritime crimes, we have no option than to equip our Navy to be able to guarantee a 
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secure environment where all legitimate entities can operate freely without hindrance.”  
(Daniel, 2012). 
3.2 - Bilateral Measures 
At the regional level, there are various bilateral and multilateral arrangements to tackle 
piracy.  The Nigerian Navy commenced a joint patrol with the Republic of Benin, code 
named ‘Operation Prosperity’ led by Nigerian Navy personnel in October 2011. Three 
war ships, all from Nigeria, including five support vessels, two defender boats and 
helicopters are involved in the exercise (Usman, 2011). This was an initiative of the 
Presidents of Nigeria and Benin. According to Dieng, “the maritime operation is a 
political arrangement not a legal one” (A. Dieng, personal communication, September 4, 
2012). Therefore there is the need enhance the legal aspects especially in the prosecution 
of piracy suspects. 
An IMO/Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa (MOWCA)Forum in 
October 2006, agreed to the establishment of an integrated coast guard function network 
for West and Central African countries which among other things agreed to cooperate in 
several areas such as combating piracy, armed robbery against ships and other maritime 
crimes (Addico,2008) . According to Diop, “apart from Nigeria, Cape Verde and  Cote d 
´Ivoire, the implementation of the sub regional coast guard network in other states is 
fraught with challenges. These include poor legislative framework, poor institutional 
arrangements, lack of funding and inadequate skilled human resources” (A. Diop, 
personal communication, October 14, 2012). 
In addition, in response to UNSC Resolution 2018 on the need for an anti-piracy strategy 
and regional cooperation, ECOWAS and the Economic Community of Central African 
States   (ECCAS) during their meeting in Benin from 26-29 March 2012 signed a 
memorandum of understanding in Benin to combat piracy, robbery at sea and other 
illicit activities in the region ( Chuter ,2012). 
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According to Dieng, “following the recorded success of Nigerian Navy/ Benin 
Operation Prosperity, ECOWAS held a workshop from 28-29 August 2012 to draft a 
multilateral agreement for the establishment of a proposed Zone that would comprise 
Benin, Niger, Nigeria and Togo of the maritime region of West Africa to suppress illicit 
Maritime activities. It is instructive to note that Niger, a landlocked country is part of 
Zone E because of her heavy dependence on the Benin ports for importation of goods 
and commodities. The Zone E arrangement is a replication of the commendable efforts 
of the maritime patrols zoning system (A, C and D) of ECCAS” (A. Dieng, personal 
communication, September 4, 2012). 
Albeit, ECCAS member States relatively comprehensive collective anti-piracy 
architecture over the past three years, their  efforts were still limited in scope and  
effectiveness as individual Central African States were finding it increasingly difficult to 
continue to finance and support naval operations on their own (UNSC , 2012a). 
However, the collaboration between ECCAS and ECOWAS to combat piracy is a 
prospect for enhanced cooperation. 
3.3 - Multilateral Measures 
 In 2005, US introduced its National Strategy for Maritime Security which included 
plans to improve maritime capacities of African coastal states. In 2007, the US 
established Africa Command (AFRICOM) and in conjunction with United States Navy 
has been conducting several activities through its Global Fleet Concept in African 
Partnership Station (APS) to build capacities of African navies to enforce maritime laws 
(Ploch, 2011,p.16).The APS conducts joint exercises, port visits and practical 
professional training  with the coastal nations( Ezeobi, 2012).In terms of funding, the 
U.S has provided 35 million dollars, since 2007 to regional states to build maritime 
security capacity such as coastal radars, equipment, boats, and associated training. The 
latter resulted in developing the first multi-national maritime exercise in the Gulf of 
Guinea, the Obangame Express 2012, over a two-day period (Galamas & Bilala, 2012). 
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3.4 - The United Nations Response 
Given the Gulf of Guinea’s relative economic importance (Nelson & Ware, 2012), and 
seriousness of the threat the UN sent an assessment mission to West Africa to evaluate 
the situation (Rhinehard, 2012). In addition ,United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
adopted UNSC resolutions 2018 (2011) and 2039 (2012),  expressing  concern about the 
threat posed by piracy and armed robbery to international navigation and called for 
interagency and littoral states (UNSC,2011;UNSC,2012c). To that end, the UN 
specifically advocated for a regional conference in concert with the African Union to 
elaborate on a regional strategy to fight piracy (Philips, 2012).  
3.5 - Challenges hampering efforts in combating Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea 
Before discussing the strategies to combat piracy in the Gulf of Guinea sub region, it is 
necessary to look at some of the challenges that could be obstacles to cooperation in the 
region. This necessity is based on historical antecedents. According to Fajriyansah 
(2007) conducting a war against piracy is a heavy and complicated task. Many problems 
and challenges must be faced by the states and international organizations because every 
year the piracy number of attacks remains high (Fajriyansah, 2007, p.121). Giving 
credence to this statement, Bateman (2005) ,stated that the proposal for a Regional 
Maritime Surveillance and Safety Regime for Southeast Asian waters suggested by the 
Institute of Strategic and International Studies in Malaysia was marred by several 
difficulties such as lack of clear interest between possible member states, regional 
sensitivities to particular issues including fishing and disputed maritime claims 
(Bateman, 2005,p.261).It is on this premise that this  section looks at challenges 
hampering the efforts to tackle piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. 
These challenges   inter alia are lack of political will, poor maritime domain awareness 
and maritime border disputes. Others include poor technological base, inadequate 
interagency cooperation, inadequate capacity of navies and coast guards, increasing 
influence of extra regional powers and weak legal framework. 
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3.5.1 - Lack of Political Will 
In many developing countries, the political will to adequately fund naval assets 
acquisition and maritime operations is lacking (Usoro, 2012). Often most of the region’s 
policy makers and politicians lack the understanding of the importance of maritime 
security. As a result, maritime strategy, a very strong concept to ensure the adequate 
safety and protection of the maritime environment is relegated to the background 
(Quashie, 2010) .According to Dieng,” most states in West Africa do not have a national 
maritime strategy”. The maritime strategy project is often seen as an unproductive 
exercise (Quashie, 2010).There is no gainsaying that an “unwavering political will is 
critical to any successful strategy is lacking due to vestiges of a land centric approach”    
(Gilpin, 2007). Apart from the ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 
1990s, no large peacekeeping operation within Africa had involved naval forces ( 
Ibrahim, 2009).However, there is still much to be done to educate policy makers on the 
derivable benefits from a well-protected maritime environment (Quashie,2010). If not 
adequately addressed, the lack of political will can militate against the establishment of a 
strategy to combat piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. 
3.5.2 - Maritime Border Disputes  
The primary obstacle that hinders interstate cooperation anywhere is concern over 
sovereignty (Murphy, 2010, p.82).Where claims of two or more coastal states intersect 
for reasons of territorial, contiguous , Exclusive Economic Zone or continental shelf 
delimitation, complex issues or disputes are often raised (Cozens, 2005 ,p.116). This 
restraint is reinforced by a certain lack of political commitment to many cooperative 
activities and can be manifested also in the failure to implement or comply with 
international instruments (Bateman, 2001). Examples of maritime disputes in the Gulf of 
Guinea include those between:  Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon over an island at the 
mouth of the Ntem River; and Gabon and Equatorial Guinea over the Mbane Island and 
Corisco Bay boundaries (Gilpin, 2007). On the other hand, recently, there have been 
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calls for the Nigerian government to appeal the International Court of Justice judgment 
of 2002 in the land and maritime boundary dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria 
ceding the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon. To ensure a peaceful coexistence with 
Cameroon, the Nigerian government decided not to pursue the review of the case 
(Ibegwam, 2012). This act by the Nigerian government indicates prospects for enhanced 
cooperation in the region. In contrast, if maritime disputes are not properly resolved 
certain states might take actions based on self-interest and jeopardize any effort to 
enhance maritime security. 
3.5.3 - Inadequate Inter –Agency Cooperation 
Conflicting and duplicity of national polices and legislation in many African states has 
been a challenge to regional cooperation in maritime issues. Often times there are two 
regional organizations with similar mandates which operate in the same area without any 
tangible effort to harmonize their operations (Wambua, 2009). In addition, the collective 
efforts being carried out by various countries and regional organizations could be 
counterproductive despite the successes gained and militate against the enhancement of 
maritime security in the region (Galamas & Bilala, 2012). For instance with 23 diverse 
countries across the region, achieving consensus strategies on fighting maritime piracy 
has been difficult. A classic case is the several maritime initiatives undertaken by several 
regional organizations. For example, the Central African States recently set up a 
Regional Centre for Maritime Security in Central Africa to enhance information sharing: 
in West Africa, member States of the ECCAS and ECOWAS established their own 
maritime security efforts. Another cooperative effort involves the Gulf of Guinea 
Commission (GGC) and the MOWCA, who set up their respective plans and 
memoranda of understanding. With so many concurrent efforts, it could result into 
duplication of efforts and a regional rivalry may emanate if not properly coordinated 
(Galamas & Bilala, 2012). 
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3.5.4 - Poor Maritime Domain Awareness 
In the words of Admiral Gary Roughead``Maritime Domain Awareness is where it all 
begins. We cannot conduct the operations that we must if we don’t have a good sense of 
what’s out there, moving on, above or under the sea.’’(Boraz, 2009, p.136) 
Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) involves generating actionable intelligence to 
effectively conduct various maritime tasks, counter terrorism and maritime law 
enforcement operations (Akpan, 2010, p.45). From the foregoing, actionable intelligence 
is the single most important prerequisite for interdicting illicit traffic at sea (Quashie, 
2010). As stated earlier, the traditional land centric approach to security has contributed 
to a systemic neglect of maritime forces. In addition, many citizens of Africa do not 
comprehend and have not seen the sea (Fouché, 2010b). Basic equipment for 
surveillance, patrol boats and trained personnel are inadequate. This situation is a 
militating factor in combating piracy in the sub region (Alege, 2010). In order to address 
security issues, situational awareness of the maritime domain is critical as it would 
provide the necessary information to African leaders to make informed decisions that 
would enhance maritime security (Ibrahim, 2009). 
According to Okae, “the maritime component of the ECOWAS Standby Military Force 
is the least developed to further lend credence to poor maritime domain awareness in the 
region” (C. Okae, September 4, 2012). This lack of maritime domain awareness remains 
an issue a matter acknowledged by two speakers from West Africa at the 2009 Sea 
Power for Africa Symposium in Cape Town (Vrey,2009, p.26). Poor maritime domain 
awareness can seriously hamper efforts to combat maritime crimes in the Gulf of 
Guinea. 
3.5.5 - Inadequate Capacity of Navies and Coast Guards 
Many regional countries lack the capacity to take part on the same plane in any 
cooperative endeavor (Bateman, 2001). The status of most African navies is an obstacle 
to effective regional cooperation in the governance of African ocean areas (Wambua, 
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2009). Many African countries, moreover, have prioritized investment in land-based 
forces over maritime units (Vogel, 2011).According to Admiral Ola Saad Ibrahim, an 
assessment of Africa’s naval/coast guard capabilities reveal most of them cannot 
adequately enforce  laws in their respective maritime zones (Ibrahim, 2009) See Table 3.  
Table 3: Naval Capabilities of Some Gulf of Guinea Countries. 
Serial Countries 
Personnel 
Navy/Coast 
Guard 
GDP in 
billions-US 
dollars/ in 
2009 
Defence 
Budget 2009 
US dollars 
Platforms 
1. Angola 1,000 77.7 
2.77billion(bn) Patrol and Coastal 
Combatants(PCC)-9 
Submarine-1 
2. Benin 200 7.2bn 79million(m) PCC- 2 
3. Cameroon 1,300 24.1bn 
 PCC-11 
Amphibious-2 
4. Cape Verde 100    PCC -3 
5. Congo 800 11.6bn 
 PCC-3 with several river 
boats 
6. Côte d’Ivoire 900 24.4bn 
360m PCC- 3 
Amphibious-2 
7 Senegal 950 13.5bn   
8. 
Democratic 
Republic 
Congo 
6,703  
 
PCC-3 
9. Gabon 500 12.2bn  PCC-9 
10. The Gambia 70  189m PCC-3 
11. Ghana 2,000 15billion 264m PCC-7 
12 Togo 200 3bn 67m  
13 
Guinea 
Bissau 
350 
 20m 
PCC-2 
14. Guinea 400  55m PCC-2 
15 Nigeria 8,000 135bn 1.49bn 
Principal Surface Frigates-2, 
PCC-27, Minewarfare-2, 
Amphibious-1, Logistics and 
Support vessels-5 
 Source: The Military balance, 2010. 
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Navies are not thought to be as necessary as the other branches of the armed forces and 
are often considered last in budgetary allocations. The high cost of naval equipment 
worsens the situation (Wambua, 2009). For instance the estimated cost of acquiring new 
ships for the Nigeria Navy in United States dollars are as follows; “General Purpose 
Frigate-$350million, Long Endurance Offshore Patrol Vessel-$120million, Landing 
Platform-$350million, Medium Endurance Offshore Patrol Vessel-$60million, 
Submarine-$300million and Landing Ship Tank-$90million among others 
“(Omonobi,2012). Based on the Gross Domestic Product of the Gulf of Guinea 
Countries and the defence spending in Table 3, it might be a big burden to acquire these 
relatively expensive platforms to patrol the 6000 kilometer stretch of the Gulf of Guinea.  
Another challenge is the strength of naval personnel in some the countries. Apart from 
Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo and Ghana with 8000, 6703, 2000 personnel 
respectively, the other countries are somewhat inadequate in personnel. According to the 
confession of the alleged leader of the hijack of MT Energy Centurion, there are about 
1,250 trained pirates in Nigeria (Bilesanmi& Amata, 2012). In military analysis this 
number of pirates could match the firepower of some of the weak navies put together. 
According to Ogbor, “adequate manpower and warships that would be able to sustain 
patrols in a country´s maritime zone is an effective strategy to combat piracy” (E.Ogbor, 
personal communication, September 3, 2012). Based on the foregoing, inadequate 
capacity of navies and coast guards in the Gulf of Guinea is a challenge to combat 
piracy. 
3.5.6 - Weak Legal Framework 
The provisions of international law governing piracy are relatively clear, and there are 
no significant problems of jurisdiction (Guilfoyle, 2011). The legal obstacles in 
combating piracy for states occur in implementation of international conventions due to 
weak navies or inadequate domestic criminal laws (Kraska, 2011b). In Resolution 1918 
(2010), for instance, the UN Security Council noted that the domestic criminal laws of a 
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number of states lack provisions criminalizing piracy, or are deficient in criminal 
procedural rules needed to effectively prosecute pirates (Kraska,2011b).  
Cooperation is also hindered because many regional states do not have extradition 
agreements in place (Bateman, 2001).There are other complexities involved in 
cooperation between national systems which could militate against combating piracy 
(Guilfoyle ,2011). A classic example of a complexity is:  
If a Somali pirate is apprehended by a United Kingdom warship, prosecuted in 
the Seychelles and then transferred to a third state to serve his sentence, a chain 
of legal relationships is involved. One of the basic difficulties involved in this 
type of chain, involves how to gather evidence if a capturing warship does not 
know in advance which state will agree to prosecute suspect pirates. Moreover, 
some states may also find it legally difficult to transfer suspects to partner states 
for prosecution without human rights guarantees. (Guilfoyle, 2011, p.96).  
As a consequence, more than half of suspected pirates in Somali waters deprived of their 
freedom up to December 4, 2009, were released without being prosecuted( Fouché, 
2010b).States also face a lack of political will and resources required to conduct 
expensive criminal trials and to imprison convicted pirates for long periods of time 
(Kraska,2011b).This dilemma might arise in the Gulf of Guinea if and when full anti-
piracy operations involving many of the states within the sub-region take off. Currently 
in the Gulf of Guinea states, the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Convention has  not yet 
been implemented and as far as piracy is concerned and there is no regional arrangement 
for hot pursuit across national maritime boundaries( Vrey, 2009,p.25).  
According to Mike Ibokwe, a lawyer and IMO Consultant in Nigeria, the current 
legislation with respect to trying pirates in Nigeria is inadequate. However, Nigeria is a 
signatory to the UNCLOS 1982 and SUA Convention and 2005 protocols, but these 
laws are yet to be domesticated. The current municipal law for trying piracy is the 
criminal code of 1906, which is not comprehensive (Ozoeze, 2011). This kind of piracy 
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law was drafted for piracy of a different kind from a different age, and these laws are not 
easily applied to the modern brand of piracy practiced (Cole, 2011). According to 
Ibokwe, the current situation now is that if the Nigerian Navy arrests pirates or armed 
robbers at sea, they would not be able to be prosecuted in Nigerian courts on the basis of 
the treaty that Nigeria has signed concerning SUA or the protocols to these treaties. So, 
it is only by domesticating these Conventions, of which the process is ongoing, that 
Nigeria can be on the same page with the international standards and treaty obligation 
(Ozoeze, 2011). 
A similar situation exists in Benin. Benin is a signatory to a both UNCLOS and SUA 
Conventions. However, the UN Assessment mission to Benin revealed that the country’s 
legal framework needs to be reformed to effectively address the threat of piracy. First, 
the definition of the crime of piracy is outdated and is not consistent with the definition 
of piracy under the UNCLOS (UNSC, 2012a). For example, in two recent piracy cases 
reported by the Benin authorities, suspected pirates were charged with generic offences, 
such as armed robbery, premeditated murder and conspiracy (UNSC, 2012a).Unless 
other modes of liability, such as conspiracy, are not criminalized, the potential for 
combating piracy and other forms of organized crime will remain extremely limited. In 
addition, the universal jurisdiction provided for under the Convention with respect to the 
arrest and the prosecution of pirates is not incorporated in Benin’s Maritime Code. As a 
result, Benin’s jurisdiction on piracy acts committed on the high seas is limited to acts 
committed by its citizens or on board of Beninese ships. Moreover, while the national 
Maritime Code contains rules for the investigation of offences committed at sea by 
various national authorities and the handling of suspects arrested at sea, it needs to be 
updated and streamlined (UNSC, 2012a). 
The ultimate obstacle to more piracy prosecutions is political will as finding states 
willing to detain convicted pirates, is difficult, as this entails a much larger cost than 
prosecution outside the territorial sea (Guilfoyle, 2011). According to Ukonga of the 
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Gulf of Guinea Commission the inadequate legal framework for dealing with piracy in 
the region, is causing the release of piracy suspects.  There is an urgent need to have a 
common definition of piracy, with the same type of punishment and a neutral 
jurisdiction to try piracy suspects (UNSC,2012b).The issue of weak legal framework if 
not adequately addressed can militate against the implementation of a strategy to combat 
piracy. 
3.5.7 - Poor Technological Base 
Most African governments lack technological expertise and institutions for repair and 
maintenance of platforms and equipment. In addition, international partners donate or 
sell security equipment to Africa with only basic training in operation and repair. 
Critically absent is support for locally-driven technological adaptation (Vogel, 2011). 
This low technological base is an issue hindering development efforts in Third World 
countries. For instance Nigeria acquired warships with advanced technologies that 
require high cost of maintenance, where the local technology could not support. Further, 
the dockyard repair facilities and surveillance systems are capital intensive and cannot 
be supported by the funding of the Nigerian Navy. As previously explained this low 
technological base greatly affected the operational and patrolling capability of most 
Nigerian Navy ships and thus led to increased piracy attacks especially in 2003. From 
the foregoing low technological base could pose a challenge to enhance maritime 
security (Usoro, 2012, p.63). Despite, the poor technological challenge, Nigerian Navy 
was able to build a Seaward Defence Boat with high local resources (Stephen, 2012). 
This feat attained can be sustained if more funds are appropriated to the Nigerian Navy 
for research and development. 
3.5.8 - Increasing influence of extra-regional powers in Africa 
The United States increased its influence and presence in the Gulf of Guinea by the 
establishment of AFRICOM (Ibrahim, 2009). On the other hand, the presence of 
Chinese warships in Somalia waters is a subtle way to expand its military influence in 
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Africa (Murphy, 2012). Until the crisis in the Niger Delta, US purchased almost 
1.1million barrels per day of Nigeria’s oil (Mane, 2005).  In January 2006, Nigeria 
extended licenses to China for a commitment to invest $4.4 billion in refining and power 
generation, giving Chinese companies a 45 percent stake in new oil fields (Rougheen, 
2007). Again, Angola exports about 2 million barrels of oil per day with 25 percent 
going to the US and 25 percent to China.  Also China provided $2 billion in loans and 
aid to Angola (Osaretin, 2011).From the foregoing China wants to use its new found 
power to influence or alter the international system to suit its own worldview (Murphy, 
2012). For instance China’s investment in Sudan limited the ability of the UN Security 
Council to utilize Chapter VII sanctions to address the conflict in Darfur (Goldwyn & 
Morrison, 2005).   Therefore one of the major roles of AFRICOM in the Gulf of Guinea 
is to checkmate the rising influence of China in Africa (Onuoha, 2008). There have been 
mixed reactions as to the implications of AFRICOM on African soil. While some 
countries like Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone had accepted, and even offered their domain 
for AFRICOM, Nigeria has been opposed to the basing of the Command on African soil 
(Onuoha, 2008). 
Coupled with the rising influence is the competition for influence between regional 
powers. China as a global power has access to any leader in the region. African leaders 
can now turn to the East for financial and political support. Competition for influence 
with the region’s leaders can be a serious obstacle to any cooperative agreement 
(Goldwyn & Morrison, 2005). This rising influence presents a challenge to African 
nations to forge a common front (Ibrahim, 2009). Based on the foregoing, and especially 
current events in the Syria crisis, it is clear that when two opposing global powers with 
interests in a certain place are impinged, it could militate against any cooperative 
regime. 
 
 
53 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter identified numerous efforts by national and extra regional governments, as 
well as international organizations to address the problem of piracy. It was observed that 
that some processes had been ongoing for many years, while some were just recent in 
2012. Despite all these measures, piracy has not abated. Apart from factors that 
encourage piracy as discussed earlier, there were identified challenges which could be 
obstacles to cooperation to combat piracy. It was identified that a major challenge was 
lack of political will as a result of poor maritime culture and marine domain awareness. 
Others were legal barriers and inadequate capacity of navies. With regards to the size of 
the Gulf of Guinea it would be difficult for the current platforms available to fight 
piracy. Therefore it is important to devise a comprehensive strategy to mitigate the 
challenges in countering piracy. The next chapter seeks to address that.  
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Chapter 4 
4. - Integrated Maritime Security Strategy to mitigate the Challenges hampering 
Efforts to combat piracy in the Gulf of Guinea 
The challenges hampering efforts in combating piracy and armed robbery at sea in the 
Gulf of Guinea can be only be addressed by a combination of measures such as 
enhancement of political will, improved maritime domain awareness and provision of 
adequate fleet maintenance facilities. Others are heightened public awareness and 
regional cooperation. Arguably, however the most urgent of these is regional 
cooperation. Because piracy is a Trans -boundary issue, the cooperation of all affected 
states is crucial to controlling the menace. According to Vice Admiral Hideaki Kaneda 
“Maritime Safety and Security cannot be achieved through the efforts of a single 
country. Only the mutual understanding and cooperation of regional countries can fulfill 
it” (Kaneda, 2005, p.51). 
4.1 - Regional Cooperation 
We have seen regional cooperation in varying levels in the two areas most affected by 
piracy-Southeast Asia and the Horn of Africa. In spite of the unique situations in these 
regions, lessons learnt from them could be applicable in the Gulf of Guinea. Koji 
Sekimizu, IMO Secretary General, when Director of the Maritime Safety Division, 
stated an African ReCAAP could play an active role in reducing piracy, which has 
assumed dangerous proportions in Nigeria and Somalia…(Menefee,2010,p.198). 
The UN and IMO are the foremost organizations in the world in constant pursuit of 
relative peace and safety in the world’s maritime environment. To this end, these 
organizations have regularly issued resolutions identifying cooperation especially 
regional cooperation as a sine qua non for suppression of piracy. In furtherance of this, 
the UN General Assembly in Resolution 63/111 of 12, February 2009 dealing with 
Oceans and Law of the Sea, Para 61, recognized the crucial role of international 
cooperation at the global, regional, sub regional and bilateral levels in combating, in 
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accordance with international law, threats to maritime security, including piracy, armed 
robbery at sea, through bilateral and multilateral instruments and mechanisms (Geiss & 
Petrig, 2011, p.44). 
In a similar vein, the IMO has through the Code of Practice for Investigation of the 
Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Ships ``invited all Governments to develop, as 
appropriate, agreements and procedures to facilitate cooperation in applying efficient 
and effective measures to prevent acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships’’(IMO, 
2010). In tandem with UN Security resolution 2018 and IMO/MOWCA efforts in 
establishing a regional integrated coast guard for the Gulf of Guinea, it would be 
apposite to look at existing main arrangements to counter piracy which are ReCAAP and 
DCoC. 
The ReCAAP was one of the countermeasures set up to combat piracy in the Strait of 
Malacca. The other measures include a sea patrol initiative and a joint air patrol called 
Eyes in the Sky (EiS) (Ng, 2011, p.1). In 2004, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore 
initiated coordinated maritime patrols, called MALSINDO to address crime in the 
Malacca Straits (Farley & Gortzak, 2009). The Maritime Security Patrol was 
coordinated rather than joint each country responsible for patrolling its own waters 
(Storey, 2008, p.119). In 2005, the EiS initiative was launched and was intended to 
achieve maritime domain awareness while the naval patrols were to physically secure 
and defend that domain (Ong & Ho, 2005). These countermeasures successfully reduced 
the number of pirate attacks, with only 2 incidents reported in 2009 (Ng, 2011, p.1). 
Based on the success, the IMO meeting on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore held in 
Malaysia in September 2006 and the 60
th
 session of the UN General Assembly 
welcomed the advances the regional cooperation brought about by ReCAAP (Kraska, 
2011a, p.145).As a consequence, the IMO sponsored a similar model of a regional 
agreement in the Horn of Africa to implement anti-piracy measures. This initiative gave 
birth to the Djibouti Code of Conduct (Kraska, 2011, p.147). 
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4.2 - Background to ReCAAP 
The ReCAAP Convention had its acknowledged origins in the Tokyo Appeal of March 
2000 and the Asia Anti-Piracy Challenges 2000 and the Tokyo Model Action Plan of 
April (Menefee, 2010, p.188). The Tokyo Appeal makes reference to a set of 
recommendations developed by the IMO, that inter alia, call for ``further development 
of regional cooperation’’ and ``a regional agreement to facilitate coordinated response at 
the tactical as well as the operational level’’ to be concluded between the countries 
concerned’’ (Mejia, 2010b). ReCAAP is the first regional government-to-government 
agreement and it was finalized on 11 November 2004 and entered into force on 4 
September 2006. To date, 18 States have become Contracting Parties to ReCAAP. The 
Contracting Parties are Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Denmark, India, Japan, 
the Republic of Korea, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Netherlands, 
Norway, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, United Kingdom and Viet Nam 
(ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre, 2011).The Agreement called for the setting up of 
an Information Sharing Centre (ISC), which was launched 29 November 2006 in 
Singapore (Ho, 2008).  ReCAAP establishes a framework for cooperation among the 
member states on three main aspects; information sharing, capacity   building and 
operational cooperation (Storey, 2008, p114). It is pertinent to note that Malaysia and 
Indonesia, two important countries in the region are not contracting parties to ReCAAP 
(Mejia, 2010b).  
4.2.1- Major Features of ReCAAP 
Article 1 of the Agreement takes verbatim the definition of piracy in UNCLOS Article 
101 and armed robbery against ships as contained in Annex to Resolution A.922(22) of 
the IMO.This could be due to several issues including locational, two ship requirement 
surrounding the definitions of`` piracy and armed  robbery against ships’’. 
Article 3 deals with  General Obligations wherein contracting parties are required to take 
all effective measures in accordance with national and international laws to prevent and 
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suppress piracy and armed robbery against ships, arrest pirates and armed robbery 
suspects, seize ships taken by or under the control of pirates and rescue victims of piracy 
and armed robbery against ships. 
Article 4 is one of the pillars of the agreement. It deals with the establishment of the 
Information Sharing Center, located in Singapore. With a staff of thirteen to fifteen 
representing the member states, it has the status of an international organization as found 
in Article 5 and designed to enhance communication and information on incidents of 
piracy and armed robbery in the region (Menefee, 2010).  The center is composed of a 
Governing Council and a Secretariat. 
Article 6 provides for the funding of the ISC from host states, voluntary contributions 
from contracting parties and international organizations. It is important to note that 
inadequate funding can be a major setback for any organizational outfit, hence the need 
for the proper funding of the Center. 
Article 9 requires each contracting party to designate a focal point responsible for 
communication with the Center. The focal point is the nexus for smooth and effective 
communication with other national authorities. All contracting parties are required to 
notify focal points of incidents of piracy or armed robbery against ships. 
Article 12 obliges contracting parties, subject to its national laws, shall endeavor to 
extradite pirates or armed robbery suspects, present in its territory, to the other 
Contracting Party which has jurisdiction over them, at the request of that Contracting 
Party. This article is worded in a rather cautious language. It does not provide for a strict 
obligation to prosecute or extradite piracy suspects (Geiss & Petrig, 2011, p.46) .This is 
a limitation, considering the tendency of pirates to evade arrest by seeking refuge in a 
state with weak legislation on piracy. Article 13 provides for Contracting states to render 
mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, including submission of evidence related to 
piracy and armed robbery against ships. This aspect is particularly important due to 
prosecutorial challenges that might arise as a result of want of evidence to try pirates. 
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Article 14 deals with Capacity Building one of the pillars of the Agreement. The 
Agreement obliges Contracting Parties to the fullest possible extent endeavor to 
cooperate or provide capacity building assistance which may include educational and 
training programmes to share experiences and best practices. 
Article 15 deals with cooperative arrangements such as joint exercises, or other forms of 
cooperation. Article 17 provides for settlement of disputes which might arise as a result 
of interpretation or application of the Agreement through negotiations in accordance 
with international laws.  
4.2.2 - Lessons Learned from ReCAAP 
 Designation of Focal Points 
The designation of a focal point by each contracting party for the ISC is considered one 
of the strengths of ReCAAP. A Contracting Party not in the habit of inter-agency 
coordination would have to look at one its numerous organizations for dealing with 
piracy and armed robbery and also identify the inter-agency processes associated with it 
(Ho, 2008). This aspect is particularly important for the Gulf of Guinea where there are 
numerous agencies involved in maritime security issues and the duplication of effort as 
previously mentioned. Hence a focal point for armed robbery and piracy reports could 
enhance information sharing amongst agencies. 
Capacity Building Programme 
The capacity building programme has been identified as one of the strength of ReCAAP. 
Technical assistance, exercises, training workshops and sharing of best practices 
inculcates a great awareness among contracting parties (Ho, 2008). This is an 
opportunity for better resourced and funded parties to assist less funded parties to 
achieve the common goal of suppressing piracy and armed robbery and vice versa in 
terms of sharing experiences and best practices. 
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Cooperative Arrangements 
ReCAAP is an inclusive organization. Piracy and armed robbery affects both 
governments and the shipping industry alike. The Agreement shares information and 
cooperates with all stakeholders such as IMO, Baltic and International Maritime Council 
(BIMCO), Asian Shipowners´ Forum (ASF) and International Independent Tanker 
Owners´ Organization (INTERTANKO) that have knowledge and the capacity to deal 
with piracy issues. ReCAAP also allows accession by any state outside the Asian region, 
which allows the organization to grow (Ho, 2008). A Regional Agreement can serve as 
vehicle to receive assistance. While external assistance can be vital, a regional 
organization can ensure the efficient use of resources among member states, negating the 
impression that measures and programmes are imposed by extra –regional forces (Mejia, 
2010b).Piracy is a global phenomenon (Murphy, 2010) hence, it would be desirable for 
affected and interested parties to join and give support for the fight against piracy. This 
area is particularly necessary in the area of acquisition of ships for weak navies and 
technical support for the Gulf of Guinea countries. 
 Challenges of ReCAAP 
There is no gainsaying that when many nations are involved in a project there is bound 
to be some challenges. The fact that Malaysia and Indonesia are not parties to ReCAAP 
is a big challenge for the Agreement. Most of the piratical attacks occurred in these 
countries and they were critical in the reduction of piracy in the region (Mejia, 2010b). 
ReCAAP has been working hard to cover this gap by working with the relevant 
maritime agencies in Malaysia and Indonesia (Ho, 2008). 
Another challenge facing ReCAAP is the delay in receiving reports from focal points, 
which could undermine operations of the Center. To remedy this situation, the shipping 
industry and ships are encouraged to report directly to the ISC, to improve timeliness of 
reports and facilitate response to incidents (Ho, 2008). If and when an ISC is established 
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in the Gulf of Guinea, reports from all shipping related agencies could be collated and 
processed to ensure quick response to piracy attacks. 
Similar to delay in filing reports, is the challenge of underreporting which ISCs will 
encounter. Most ships are reluctant to report attacks due to fear of prolonged 
investigations and unnecessary delays. The collation and analysis of data is important in 
the fight against maritime crimes (Mejia, 2010b). This is where ship-owners and 
maritime stakeholders have to work seriously to cover the information sharing gap. One 
of the areas that could be improved upon, if ReCAAP is adapted to another region is the 
issue of capacity building in areas of extradition and mutual legal assistance (Mejia, 
2010b). 
A big challenge to any organization is the issue of funding. Despite the successes 
recorded by ReCAAP the challenge of finances rears its ugly head. Only less than half 
of the members contribute to the organization coffers (Mejia, 2010b). Menefee (2010) 
noted “that this cannot be considered a healthy situation in an organization which is 
supposed to be run on consensus and should be rectified as soon as possible. Otherwise, 
it is hard to believe that countries footing the bill will not eventually develop an 
unhealthy, if understandable, a sense of entitlement concerning ReCAAP ISC and its 
operations “(Menefee, 2010, p.191). 
Based on the foregoing, even though ReCAAP has its shortcomings evident of any 
human endeavor, its strengths of information sharing, capacity building and cooperative 
arrangements are tested and tried ventures that could be replicated in pirate hotspots like 
the Gulf of Guinea. 
4.3 - Background to DCoC 
The DCoC was signed on 29 January 2009 by representatives of Djibouti, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Madagascar, Maldives, Seychelles, Somalia, the United Republic of Tanzania 
and Yemen. With the signing by South Africa on 15 May, the number of signatures was 
brought to 19 States out of the 21 eligible to sign. The 19 signatory States are: the 
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Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya, Madagascar, Maldives, 
Mauritius, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Somalia, South Africa, the Sudan, the 
United Arab Emirates, the United Republic of Tanzania and Yemen (IMO, 2012). In 
addition to the DCoC, various international taskforces to combat piracy were established 
as a response to threat to international shipping in the Horn of Africa. One of the 
taskforces was the Combined Maritime Forces led by the United States (Geiss & Petrig, 
2011, p25). In addition, the European Union (EU) in 2008, created the EU Naval Force 
Somalia (NAVFOR ATALANTA), to protect ships from the World Food Programme 
(WFP) (Maouche, 2010, p.6). Another taskforce was initiated by the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), Operation Allied Provider in October 2008 to escort 
World Food Programme ships delivering supplies to Somalia (Tutu, 2011, p.12). In 
2008, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolutions 1816 and 1851 
authorizing countries to enter Somali territorial waters and use all necessary means to 
repress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea and on land as well in a manner 
consistent with the provision of international law with consent with Somalia’s interim 
government (Ho, 2009). 
4.3.1- Principal Features of DCoC 
To effectively fight the scourge of piracy in the Horn of Africa, Article 1 of the Code 
adopts both the UNCLOS and IMO definitions of piracy and armed robbery against 
ships. 
Measures to Repress Piracy are contained in Annex 4.  Paragraph 7 provides for a 
participant which carries out a seizure, may, ``subject to its national laws and in 
consultation with other interested entities, waive its primary right to exercise jurisdiction 
and authorize any other Participant to enforce its laws against the ship and /or persons 
onboard’’. In addition, it obliges any seizure made in the territorial sea of a Participant 
should be subject to the jurisdiction of that Participant. Paragraph 5, states no 
“Participant should pursue a ship in or over the territory or territorial sea of any coastal 
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state without the permission of that State”. This goes to show respect for the territorial 
integrity of a participating state. 
Article 7 of the Code deals with Embarked officers. This is a distinct part of the Code 
that ReCAAP does not have. The Code provides for armed officers to embark in the 
patrol ships or aircraft of another Participant. It further states that, the ``embarked 
officers may assist the host Participant and conduct operations from the host Participant 
ship or aircraft if expressly requested to do so by the host Participant, and only in the 
manner requested’’. According to Wambua (2010), this provision is aimed at facilitating 
the subsequent exercise of adjudicative jurisdiction by the national courts of the state of 
the embarked officials (Wambua, 2010, p.10). Based upon this provision the ongoing 
anti-piracy operation of Nigerian and Benin is a good opportunity to assess the 
practicalities of the embarkation of officers from Benin republic onboard Nigerian 
vessels with a view to improving upon the concept. 
The Code also has similar provisions with ReCAAP Article 3 of the Code with regards 
to protection measures for ships taken after Article 16 of ReCAAP. In the same vein, 
Articles 8,9,10 of the Code concerning coordination and information sharing, incident 
reporting and general assistance among participants resemble Articles 9 and 10 of 
ReCAAP. To ensure coordinated, smooth and effective communications between focal 
points, the Code makes provisions for 3 ISCs in Kenya, Tanzania and Yemen.  Article 9 
intends to provide for Participants the “development of uniform reporting criteria in 
order to ensure an accurate assessment of the threat of piracy and armed robbery in the 
Western Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden”. 
One of the pillars of the Code is Article 11 regarding Review of National Legislation. It 
is thus extracted from the DCoC: 
In order to allow for the prosecution, conviction and punishment of those 
involved in piracy or armed robbery against ships, and  to facilitate extradition or 
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handing over when prosecution is not possible, each Participant intends to review 
its national legislation with a view towards ensuring that there are national laws 
in place to criminalize piracy and armed robbery against ships, and adequate 
guidelines for the exercise of jurisdiction, conduct of investigations, and 
prosecutions of alleged offenders. 
The purpose of this Article is to ensure that persons arrested for piracy and armed 
robbery against ships do not evade prosecution. 
Article 12 of the Code obligates Parties to settle disputes by consultation and peaceful 
means.The Code is dissimilar to ReCAAP in the sense that it is not binding. Article 
(15a) states:  
Nothing in this Code is intended to create a binding agreement, except as noted 
in Article 13, which states that within two years of the effective date of the Code, 
and having designated the national focal points to in Article 8, the participants 
intend to consult with the aim of arriving at a binding agreement.  
This aspect of a non-binding agreement where the framers adopted the term Code of 
Conduct rather than treaty, convention, or agreement reflects a major weakness of the 
Code (Wambua, 2010, p.9).  Unlike the ReCAAP, DCoC is not open for accession by 
any state (Geiss & Petrig, 2011, p.50).  
Resolution 3 provides for Enhancing Training in the region for officials designated by 
Governments. To that effect, a training centre was established in Djibouti to ensure the 
wide, effective and uniform implementation of the provisions of the Code. 
4.3.2 - Lessons learned from DCoC 
Achievements of the DCoC 
Geiss and Petrig (2011) suggested that the Code has “been praised as a milestone 
development a central instrument in the development of regional capacity” (Geiss & 
Petrig, 2011). In the area of national legislation to meet international standards, 12 of the 
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member states have introduced changes to their laws (Bueger & Saran, 2012). This is a 
clear sign of progress in the fight against piracy. 
Furthermore, Inter agency cooperation improved amongst the navies, coastguards and 
marine police as a result of training and capacity building on legal issues by United 
Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC). The resultant effect was arrest of more 
criminals into the national legal systems (Bueger & Saran, 2012). 
A fund named Djibouti Code of Conduct Trust Fund was established in 2009 for the 
administration of the agreement. Many countries and international organizations 
including UN and IMO member states, private individuals have contributed over 14 
million US dollars to the process (Bueger & Saran, 2012). 
The DCoC ISCs and ReCAAP established   Standard Operating Procedures for 
exchange of information on piracy related matters. This is considered a major 
achievement for collaboration between Asia and Africa to enhance the Western Indian 
Ocean anti – piracy framework (Bueger & Saran, 2012). Based on the above 
achievements it can be seen that there is appreciable progress in training, information 
sharing and capacity building. 
Challenges of DCoC 
There is difficulty in fostering security cooperation by the participating states in terms of 
joint multilateral operations or collective responses. This is evident in the lack of 
consensus by the states to have one ISC, like ReCAAP (Bueger & Saran, 2012). 
According to Mejia, the establishment of 3 ISCs makes for a potentially cumbersome 
arrangement (Mejia, 2010b). 
Excluding two major coastal states that are regional powerhouses, Pakistan and India is 
a major challenge for the Code. The anti-piracy fight is concentrated on Africa and not 
on the Western Indian Ocean region. These countries can provide capacity and 
leadership. Both states are at the forefront of counter-piracy efforts, given the extension 
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of the operational terrain of piracy groups (Bueger & Saran, 2012). Moreover, the 
political dimension of the region is a challenge that cannot be overlooked. ReCAAP is 
made up of and has the support of vibrant economies and strong governments in Asia. 
The littoral states of the Strait of Malacca are much wealthier, their GDP level are 10 
times more than the littoral states in the Somalia region (Mejia, 2010b,: 
Ng,2011,p.11).The case of Somalia is the opposite. Somalia has been plagued by piracy 
and it is topping the failed states list. To make matters difficult, many states in the region 
are rather unstable and a few are at a high risk of being classified as failed states (Mejia, 
2010b). 
4.4 - Lessons for the Gulf of Guinea Countries in developing a Maritime Security 
Framework to Combat Piracy 
Based on the lessons learnt from the experiences of combating piracy in Southeast Asia 
and Somalia region the formulation of a maritime security strategy framework is 
considered the first step to combat piracy and tackle the identified challenges 
confronting the Gulf of Guinea countries. Ng (2011) developed an anti-piracy 
framework (see Appendix B) were the affected areas are categorized into land, territorial 
seas and international waters. The important aspects of this framework is where littoral 
states provide enabling legislation for prosecution of pirates on land and territorial 
waters as well as international support is seen to be critical to states with weak 
coastguards and navies. In addition user states and stakeholders collaborate to provide a 
secured maritime environment for commercial shipping. Some lessons from ReCAAP 
and DCoC to combat piracy and mitigate identified challenges in the Gulf of Guinea are 
presented below. 
4.4.1- Review of National Legislation  
All countries should ascribe to international conventions against piracy and facilitate 
domestication of UNCLOS 1982 and SUA 1988 provisions to overcome legal obstacles 
that hinder individual nations in combating piracy. The review of national legislation 
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could mitigate the challenges of inadequate legislation in the Gulf of Guinea countries. 
The United Nations offices in West Africa (UNOWA) and UNODC should assist states 
in the region to harmonize their laws dealing with piracy and armed robbery against 
ships. The IMO circular letter No.3180 of 17 May 2011 containing information and 
guidance on elements of international law relating to piracy might be useful (IMO, 
2011). In addition, the Model National Law on Acts of Piracy and Maritime violence 
prepared by Comité Maritime International is a useful starting point tool in this regard 
(Beckman,2002,p.333). 
4.4.2 - Establishment of an Information Sharing Centre to enhance Inter -Agency 
Coordination 
The enhancement of interagency cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea could mitigate the 
challenge of poor interagency cooperation among states. Designating focal points and 
establishment of an information sharing center is considered desirable to this end. Focal 
points could enhance interagency cooperation by (1) managing all piracy and armed 
robbery incidents within its territorial waters, (2) acting as point of contact for the ISC, 
(3) facilitating its country law enforcement investigation and coordinating surveillance 
and enforcement for piracy and armed robbery with neighbouring focal points (Ho, 
2008). The focal points could be the country’s coast guard, marine police, navy, port 
authority, maritime administration or customs (Ho, 2005). The ISC could be located at 
the Regional Maritime Search and Rescue Coordination Centre in Lagos, Nigeria. The 
choice of Nigeria is because as at now Nigeria is in the forefront of the antipiracy fight, 
and it is where most of the pirates operate from. The ISC could be made up of 
government and ship industry stakeholders from participating states especially naval, 
coast guards and legal personnel to facilitate exchange of information. 
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4.4.3 - Collaborative Funding  
An Agreement could serve as a vehicle for technical support and funding of maritime 
security activities in a region. Therefore the establishment of a maritime security fund 
likened to the current ECOWAS Peace Fund could mitigate the challenge of inadequate 
funding.  The aim is to source for funds to enable states to combat piracy effectively. 
Initially, Gulf of Guinea countries could be persuaded to contribute 1 percent of their 
annual earnings from crude oil sales for the acquisition and joint production programme 
of appropriate mix of platforms and maritime domain surveillance assets. Financial 
assistance could also be made by international organizations, user states, maritime 
stakeholders and ship-owners to help reduce burden on weak states. 
4.4.4 - Adoption of Best Management Practices 
Analysis from the Horn of Africa reveals 65 per cent of attacks were foiled by efforts of 
merchant ships themselves (Ng, 2011, p.8).  According to IMB reports described earlier, 
anti-piracy watches by ship masters in the Gulf of Guinea was a contributory factor in 
the reduction of piracy. Taking into account unavailability of naval presence in some sea 
areas, it is important ocean going vessels, ship owners adopt self-protective measures. It 
is on this premise that IMO recommended Best Management Practices should be 
adopted. 
4.5 - Other Strategies to Combat Piracy 
As mentioned earlier integrated maritime security strategies comprise not only an 
effective regional cooperation mechanism but other important elements as well. Some of 
these are public enlightenment on maritime issues, enhancement of political will and 
provision of adequate fleet maintenance facilities. 
4.5.1 - Public Enlightenment on Maritime Issues/Affairs 
Public enlightenment on maritime issues could mitigate the challenge of poor maritime 
domain awareness. Public enlightenment could be a step in curbing the problem of sea 
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blindness in the region. Both leaders and the public in general should be educated 
through conferences, seminars and workshops on the economic importance of the 
maritime environment and the need to be stakeholders in the prosperity of any maritime 
project. In addition, the enlightenment on various maritime security challenges gives a 
better understanding of the magnitude of threats in the maritime environment. 
4.5.2 - Enhancement of Political Will 
The enhancement of political will is critical to the success of any maritime security 
strategy. Leaders must be properly educated to know the economic importance of the 
maritime environment for economic prosperity. The objective is to win political support 
for improved funding of maritime security activities. According to Gilpin (2007), given 
the transnational character of maritime security threats, political will must be expressed 
regionally. Countries should be willing to cede sovereignty concerns to advance regional 
solutions (Gilpin, 2007). The Nigeria /Benin Operation Prosperity is a step in the 
direction to show a demonstrable political will. In a similar vein, the African Union is at 
the verge of creating a maritime security department. The ECCAS and ECOWAS 
prospects of cooperation are another sign of enhanced political will in the Gulf of 
Guinea. 
4.5.3 - Provision of Adequate Fleet Maintenance Facilities 
The provision of adequate fleet maintenance facilities could mitigate the challenge of 
poor technological base. The objective is to put in place repair and maintenance facilities 
to achieve capacity for sustained maritime security patrols. One of the biggest challenges 
faced by Nigeria that led to increase in piracy was the poor operational state of ships 
which lacked necessary refit. The existing dockyards and shipyards in the region would 
require urgent rehabilitation to make them meet international standards. This could be 
achieved through the encouragement of local and foreign companies to invest in the 
regions´ dockyards and shipyards. 
 
69 
 
4.6 – ECOWAS as a Mechanism to Implement Regional Agreements 
Regional Economic establishments such as ECOWAS are most apt to assist states with 
common attributes such as similar legal systems and current socio economic conditions 
to implement a regional agreement to combat piracy. Through these existing regional 
mechanisms increased, national, bilateral and trilateral initiatives can be initiated 
(Fouché, 2010b, p.152). 
ECOWAS is a regional organization of 15 West African countries. The countries are  
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire,the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea –
Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. Its main goal is 
the promotion of the economic integration among its members. ECOWAS is one the five 
regional pillars of the African Economic Community (ECOWAS, 2012). ECOWAS 
through its Technical commission for Transport, fulfill its obligations to instruments of 
the African Union, such as the African Union Maritime Transport Charter which calls 
for the harmonization of laws relating to maritime security and assisting states (Fouché, 
2010b, p.157). ECOWAS therefore has the framework to operationalize these suggested 
maritime security strategies in the short, medium and long terms. 
4.7 - Conclusion 
The Chapter identified regional cooperation as the main thrust of a strategy to combat a 
transnational crime like piracy. The UN and IMO have emphasized regional cooperation 
in their resolutions in view of challenges or obstacles that may arise in the course of 
implementing anti-piracy strategies. A review of two existing arrangements to combat 
piracy-ReCAAP and DCoC reveal information sharing, capacity building, cooperative 
arrangements and International assistance as key to any successful anti-piracy effort. 
Particularly important are domestication of the SUA 1988 Convention and protocols, 
collaborative funding, best management practices and inter agency cooperation. The 
ECOWAS currently has the institutional framework to implement these strategies to 
combat piracy off the waters of West Africa. 
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Chapter 5 
5 - Conclusion  
Piracy, which started since man commenced commerce at sea, has become a threat to 
world trade and global maritime security. Mostly recently, the contemporary hot spots of 
piracy are in Africa namely the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Guinea/West African 
waters. The Gulf of Guinea known for its strategic importance in terms of oil 
exploitation and rich fauna and closeness to the western world for supply of oil is being 
threatened by gangs of pirates. Benin republic which only had two reported piracy 
attacks between1991 and 2010, was severely affected by 20 pirate attacks in 2011. This 
situation almost brought the economy of Benin to its knees. As a consequence, several 
measures have been introduced to curb piracy most notably, Operation Prosperity, the 
Nigerian/Benin maritime patrol. This patrol reduced the rate of pirate attacks in 2012. 
Despite these efforts piracy still persists in the Gulf of Guinea, with pirates extending 
further to Togo. 
The impact of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea can be said to reverberate around the world 
due to the fact that attacks on oil tankers and bulk carriers, would definitely raise 
insurance premiums, additional costs for ship owners for transiting the Gulf of Guinea 
and ultimately high cost of goods. Attacks on oil tankers, can cause environmental 
disasters or even hike in world oil prices, which would be shown on pump price of fuel 
in countries thousands of miles from the Gulf of Guinea. Most importantly, the human 
cost of piracy is not calculable because of the trauma to seafarers and their families. 
Therefore, the term hostis humani generis or enemy of mankind makes it a duty for the 
global community to tackle this common menace. 
Several factors have been identified as contributory to piracy in the Gulf of Guinea 
including proliferation of small arms, conflict and disorder, geography and promise of 
reward. Apart from geography which cannot be altered, the other factors stem from 
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socio-economic and political short comings in the region. Piracy in the region therefore 
has an interrelationship with these factors. 
This dissertation has attempted to build a case that   regional cooperation is a sine qua 
non to combat piracy in most piracy hot spots. However, several difficulties or 
challenges do exist in the region which can be obstacles to cooperation. They include 
maritime border disputes, lack of political will, and lack of naval capacity. Others 
include influence of extra-regional powers and lack of interagency cooperation. 
Therefore a common interest must be identified before cooperation can be meaningful. 
Indeed, there are numerous solutions and measures to counter piracy, the dissertation 
identified some counter measures used in Southeast Asia and the Horn of Africa to 
repress piracy. The ReCAAP has been praised by many as a model of regional 
agreement to combat piracy. Its strengths and limitations were analysed to provide 
lessons to develop a regional anti-piracy framework in the Gulf of Guinea. Other counter 
measures examined were the MALSINDO patrols, EiS initiative and the Djibouti Code 
of Conduct as well as the international responses to piracy in Somalia. Thus the 
framework for regional cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea will include collaboration, 
coordination, information sharing and capacity building. The coordinated and 
cooperative approach used in tackling piracy has been acclaimed, because it would be 
difficult to eliminate modern day piracy unless the root causes are addressed  and all the 
littoral states  and stake holders are on board-hence a holistic approach. 
In combating piracy, key strategies are vital to mitigate identified challenges; they 
include enhancement of interagency cooperation, review of national legislation, 
collaborative funding and adoption of IMO best management practices. Others include 
public enlightenment on maritime issues, enhancement of political will and provision of 
adequate fleet repair facilities for effective policing operations. 
In conclusion, since piracy is a transnational crime and no individual state has the 
resources to combat piracy, emphasis should be put on a sustainable regional 
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cooperation. This is where the ECOWAS, as a lead organization, MOWCA, IMO and 
the United Nations can work together to suppress piracy and enhance maritime security 
in the Gulf of Guinea. If the Gulf of Guinea states together with the rest of international 
community fail to contain piracy in the Region, the Gulf of Guinea may very well 
become the latest to fall in a domino effect of sea areas where maritime commerce is 
held hostage by pirates. 
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Diop, A. Captaine Fregate, Technical Adviser  on Maritime Safety, Senegalese Navy, 
email communication, on “Progress report on MOWCA sub regional coast guard 
network”, October 14, 2012. 
 
Mohammed  I, Commander, Beninois  Navy, email communication, on” Causes and 
Impact of Piracy on Benin.” September 10,2012. 
 
Ogbor, E.O. Chief of Training and Operations, Nigerian Navy, interviewed “on Strategy 
to Combat Piracy in West African waters,” at Naval Headquarters, Abuja, Nigeria, 
September 3,2012. 
 
 Okae, C. Director, Peacekeeping and Regional Security, ECOWAS,interviewed” on  
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Guinea.”at ECOWAS Secretariat, Abuja, Nigeria, September 4,2012. 
 
Udoh, E. Deputy Director, Operations, Army Headquarters, on “Efforts of the Nigerian 
Army in Internal Security Operations in the Niger Delta of Nigeria,” at Army 
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